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I. Introductory Remarks
To state the obvious, the Charter of the United Nations is a
multilateral convention to which all members of the Organization are parties. In other words, the Charter is a treaty and consequently one will look to the Law of Treaties for guidance in its
interpretation.'
But the Charter is also a Constitution. The late Sir
Humphrey Waldock, at one time President of the International
Court of Justice, and incidentally the Rapporteur of the Internat This paper is an extension of some brief remarks made on the occasion of the first
Blaine Sloan Lecture in International Law given by Robert B. Rosenstock, Counsel,
United States Mission to the United Nations on The Lawyers Role in World Peace at
Pace University School of Law, White Plains, N.Y., Apr. 14, 1988. The author expresses
his appreciation to Richard Duffee, student research assistant, for his valuable assistance
in the preparation of this article.
tt A.B., LL.B, LL.M.; Professor Emeritus of International Law and Organization,
Pace University School of Law; formerly Director, General Legal Division, U.N. Office of
Legal Affairs, 1966-78 and Deputy to the Under Secretary-General, Legal Affairs, 1978.
1 See infra text accompanying notes 254-62.
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tional Law Commission who brought the Commission's work on
the Law of Treaties to fruition, stated in his Hague Lectures in
1962: "The Charter, like the Covenant [of the League of Nations], is technically a multilateral treaty between States. But
the Charter proclaims itself, more openly than the Covenant, to
be the Constitution of an Organization and not merely a
treaty."2

In a strict-sense, the Charter is the Constitution of the Organization. It sets forth the powers and functions of the organs
and the rights and duties of members. But it is more than that.
As Sir Humphrey indicates, in a larger sense it provides "the
constitutional framework of international law today."3 It proclaims fundamental principles of law for the world community.4
So when we face the question of applying and interpreting the
Charter we must look not only to the Law of Treaties but also to
the particular character of the Charter as a Constitution. We
will recall Chief Justice John Marshall's reminder in M'Culloch
v. Maryland" that "we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding;" 6 and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in
Missouri v. Holland7 one hundred years later: " . . . when we

are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the
Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they
have called into life a being the development of which could not
have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its
begetters." 8
Compare this with the statement of Judge Charles de Visscher in the first South West Africa (now Namibia) case:9 "...
one must bear in mind that in the interpretation of a great international constitutional instrument, like the United Nations
2

Waldock, General Course on Public InternationalLaw, 106

RECUEIL DES COURS

20

(II 1962).
1 Id. The chapter is entitled "The Constitutional Framework of International Law
Today."
I U.N. CHARTER, art. 2. See Declarationof Principlesof InternationalLaw concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625(XXV) (1970).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
6 Id. at 407 (original emphasis).
252 U.S. 416 (1920).
Id. at 433.
" International Status of South West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128 (Advisory Opinion).
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Charter, the individualistic concepts which are generally adequate in the interpretation of ordinary treaties, do not suffice."1 0
Before going further I should note that I fully appreciate
the dangers inherent in analogy and in particular, the risk in
drawing too close a parallel between the Constitution of the
United States, which established a Nation, and the Charter of
the United Nations which set up an International Organization.
Only the first is for a government. The United Nations is not yet
a government and, while it performs some governmental functions, the raw power that goes with government remains with
the member States. The effort in Chapter VII of the Charter to
transfer a modicum of that power to the Security Council has
thus far, and for the most part, remained a dead letter. Nevertheless, while noting that differences may exceed similarities,
there are comparisons which can be made between the U.S. Constitution and the U.N. Charter and there are lessons which can
be learned.
We might look first at early constitutional history and two
famous opinions of Chief Justice Marshall: M'Culloch v. Maryland and Marbury v.Madison. I would also refer to two cases,
with which incidentally I was closely connected, before the International Court of Justice. These were the Advisory Opinions
in the Reparation and Namibia cases.
In M'Culloch, Chief Justice Marshall stated: "Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."11
" International Status of South West Africa, 150 I.C.J. at 189; Judge Philip C.
Jessup, after quoting the above passage from Judge de Visscher, added:
It may be agreed that there are dangers in dealing with multipartite treaties
as 'international legislation,' but if municipal law precedents are invoked in the
interpretative process, those precedents dealing with constitutional or statutory
construction are more likely to be in point than ones dealing with the interpretation of contracts.
1966 South West Africa cases, 1966 I.C.J. 6, 352-53 (Judgment)(Jessup, J.,dissenting
opinion). See also South West Africa Voting Procedure case, 1955 I.C.J. 67, 106 (Advisory Opinion)(Lauterpacht, J., separate opinion)[hereinafter Africa Voting case]; Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations,
1950 I.C.J. 4 at 18, 23 (Advisory Opinion)(Alvarez, J. & Azevedo, J., dissenting).
" 17 U.S. at 421. In quoting this passage B. COHEN, THE UNITED NATIONS,CONSTrruTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, GROWTH AND POSSIBILITIES 6 (1961), comments:
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In the Reparationcase, the International Court of Justice in
holding that the United Nations had the capacity in international law to bring claims against a State for injury to its agents
declared: "Under international law, the Organization must be
deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties."1 2 Here,
in this enunciation of the doctrine of implied powers, is surely a
M'Culloch v. Maryland.
Is the Namibia case a Marbury v. Madison?3 Not quite. In
fact the Court specifically disclaimed a right of judicial review in
the absence of a request from the organ or organs concerned.
But having said that it did not possess powers of judicial review
or appeal in respect to decisions of other U.N. organs, and having noted that the question of the validity or conformity with
the Charter of General Assembly or Security Council resolutions
did not form the subject of the request for the advisory opinion,
it continued: "However, in the exercise of its judicial function
and since objections have been advanced the Court, in the
course of its reasoning, will consider these objections before determining any legal consequences from those resolutions."1' 4
The Court then proceeded to examine in detail and pronounce on the validity of the General Assembly and Security
Council decisions concerned. In this case it determined that they

I know no better canon of construction to be used in determining charter
power than that laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland
for determining constitutional power: . . . Member States have the right and responsibility to find means which are appropriate, which are not prohibited but
consist with the letter and spirit of the Charter to carry out the purposes of the
Charter.
Id. at 6. See also id. at 5, 15, 18.
12Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J.
174, 182 (Advisory Opinion) [hereinafter Reparation case]. The Court adds:
Upon examination of the character of the functions entrusted to the Organization and of the nature of the missions of its agents, it becomes clear that the
capacity of the Organization to exercise a measure of functional protection of its
agents arises by necessary intendment out of the Charter.
Id. at 184.
13 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
14 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
1971 I.C.J. 16, 45 (Advisory Opinion) [hereinafter Namibia].
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were valid.1 5 Now do we take this case for what the Court said or
for what the Court did? At least it has left the door wide open
for judicial review.
II.

Some Reflections on the M'Culloch and Reparation Cases

The theory of constitutional interpretation and the doctrine
of implied powers set forth by Chief Justice Marshall in
M'Culloch v. Maryland and the enunciation of the implied powers doctrine by the International Court of Justice in the Reparation case deserve closer attention. The comparison has been
noted by a number of writers.1 6 The cases of course involved different issues. In M'Culloch, the point for decision was whether
the State of Maryland could tax an instrumentality of the federal government; the Bank of the United States. In the Reparation case, the question was whether the United Nations, an international organization, could bring a claim against a State
under international law for injuries suffered by its agents in the
performance of their duties. In each case the Court had to first
determine a preliminary issue; in M'Culloch, the constitutionality of the Bank; in Reparation, whether the United Nations had
an international legal personality.
Neither of these points was expressly covered in the Constitution or Charter. Chief Justice Marshall noted that "[almong
the enumerated powers, we do not find that of establishing a
bank or creating a corporation." 7 The International Court observed that the question of personality "is not settled by the actual terms of the Charter." 18 Each Court, however, was able to
give an affirmative answer to its preliminary question by, in
Marshall's words, "a fair construction of the whole instrument, '" 9 and with a reference to practice.2 0 The Bank was held
constitutional 21 and the United Nations was found to be an in" Id. at 45-54.

"6See C.W.

JENKS, A NEW WORLD OF LAW? A STUDY OF THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW,

231 (1969);

EICHELBERGER, UN-THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

130-

1 (1970)(citing Abraham Feller).
1" M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 406.
, Reparation case, 1949 I.C.J. at 178.
" M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 406.
,o Id. at 401; Reparation case, 1949 I.C.J. at 179.
,1 Id. at 424.
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ternational person possessing international rights and duties and
having the capacity to bring international claims.22
The International Court of Justice also reached affirmative
decisions on the question of whether the U.N. could bring the
kind of claims envisaged in the request for the advisory opinion.
It had no difficulty in reaching a unanimous finding upholding
the right of the U.N. to bring an international claim against a
State for damage caused to the Organization itself.2 s It also concluded, by eleven votes to four, that the U.N. could bring a
claim for damages suffered by its agents.2 4 It was with respect to
this last point that the International Court enunciated the doctrine of implied powers quoted previously.2 5
On the question whether a state could tax an instrumentality of the federal government, the Supreme Court, noting that
the power to tax is the power to destroy,2 6 held the act of the
Legislature of Maryland "contrary to the Constitution of the
United States, and void. ''2 7 Professor Paul Brest observed that
this second part of the opinion in M'Culloch rested exclusively
on inferences from the structure of the federal system and not at
all on the text of the Constitution.2 8 While the question of the
power of States to tax the United Nations and its instrumentalities has not come before the International Court of Justice, such
taxation is precluded by Article 105 of the Charter and its implementing Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations. 9

22

Reparation case, 1949 I.C.J. at 179.

23 Id. at 180-81, 187.
24 Id. at 181-84, 187.

See infra text accompanying note 12.
M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 431.
27 Id. at 437.
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv.
'

204, 217 (1980), (referring to Professor Charles Black's structural interpretation). See
infra text accompanying note 170.
'9See, in particular, sec. 7 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations, 1 U.N.T.S 15. In the Reparation case, 1949 I.C.J. 174, the International Court of Justice, in considering the question of the Organization's international
personality, stated: "The 'Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations' of 1946 creates rights and duties between each of the signatories and the Organization." Id. at 179. Under sec. 30 of the Convention, the I.C.J. may decide disputes
between member States and the United Nations. Consequently issues of taxation could
be taken to the Court.
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While the actual questions before the U.S. Supreme Court
in M'Culloch and the International Court in Reparation were
thus quite different, the overriding importance of each is their
similar approach to constitutional interpretation and development.
We know the significance that M'Culloch has had in American constitutional history. Even as staunch a practioner of judicial restraint as Justice Frankfurter has hailed Marshall's
achievement. Referring to his reminder that "it is a constitution
we are expounding" 3 0 as being the core of his constitutional philosophy, Justice Frankfurter said: "It bears repeating because it
is, I believe, the single most important utterance in the literature of constitutional law - most important because most comprehensive and comprehending.""1 Justice Frankfurter added:
One can, I believe, say with assurance that a failure to conceive the Constitution as Marshall conceived it in M'Culloch v.
Maryland, to draw from it the national powers which have since
been exercised and to exact deference to such powers from the
states would have been reflected by a very different United States
than history knows.2
In the one hundred and seventy years since it was decided,
M'Culloch, and particularly its admonition, has been frequently
cited by successive Courts. In the Legal Tender case, decided on
March 3, 1884, the Court stated: "No question of the scope and
extent of the implied powers of Congress under the Constitution
can be satisfactorily discussed without repeating much of the
reasoning of Chief Justice Marshall in the great judgment in
McCulloch v. Maryland."' 3
M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 407 (original emphasis).
Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217,
218-19 (1955). See STONE, SEIDMAN, SUNSTEIN & TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 59 (1986).
32 Frankfurter, supra note 31, at 219. Justice Frankfurter also pointed out that Marshall "has afforded this guidance not only for his own country. In the federalisms that
have evolved out of the British Empire, Marshall's outlook in constitutional adjudications has been the lodestar." Id. at 218. See also C. ANTIEAU, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 6, 223-50 (1982); E. MCWHINNEY, SUPREME COURTS AND JUDICIAL LAW-MAKING: CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNALS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 97 (1986). Professor Antieau records
that: "In 1964 the entire Australian High Court stated: 'We must remember that it is a
constitution we are construing and it should be construed with all the generality which
the words admit.'" Id. at 6, 226 (original emphasis).
33Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 438 (1884). The Court continued:
3

3,
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And in Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell,
fifty years later, Chief Justice Hughes declared: "It was to guard
against such a narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning - 'We must never forget that it is a
constitution we are expounding' . .

.,s"

Of course Marshall's reminder is not always quoted with the
same appreciation or to the same end. In National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 5 Justice Jackson in an
opinion announcing the judgment of the Court said:
In mere mechanics of government and administration we
should, so far as the language of the great Charter fairly will permit, give Congress freedom to adapt its machinery to the needs of
A constitution, establishing a frame of government, declaring fundamental
principles, and creating a national sovereignty, and intended to endure for ages

and to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs, is not to be interpreted
with the strictness of a private contract. The Constitution of the United States, by
apt words of designation or general description, marks the outlines of the powers
granted to the National Legislature; but it does not undertake, with the precision
and detail of a code of laws, to enumerate the subdivisions of those powers, or to
specify all the means by which they may be carried into execution. Chief Justice
Marshall, after dwelling upon this view, added these emphatic words: 'In considering this question, then, we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are
expounding.'
Id. at 438-39 (original emphasis).
3' Home Building and Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 443 (1934)(original
emphasis). For a sampling of other cases citing Marshall's admonition see Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 617 (1895); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299, 316 (1941); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986); Hirabayashi v. United
States. 320 U.S. 81, 100-01 (1943). The Hirabayashicase is part of the war time treatment of Japanese Americans that our country has grown to regret. It illustrates that as
the devil may quote Scriptures, a misguided Court can quote John Marshall. Chief Justice Marshall's admonition is also quoted in concurring opinions in School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963)(Brennan, J., concurring);
Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 606-07 (1938)(Stone, J., concurring); and in dissenting opinions in Louisville Chief of Police v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 732 (1976)(Brennan
J., Marshall, J., & White, J., dissenting); Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407-08 (1978)(Blackman, J., dissenting); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S.
410, 433 n.1 (1979)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 148
(1982)(Brennan, J., & Marshall, J., dissenting); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 187
n.4 (1984)(Brennan, J., Marshall, J., & Stevens, J., dissenting). For other cases on implied powers see United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 649 (1961); Case v. Bowles, 327
U.S. 92, 102 (1946); Oklahoma ex rel Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534
(1941); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941). See also Dodd, Implied
Powers and Implied Limitations in Constitutional Law, 29 YALE L.J. 137 at 140-50, 160
(1919).
8 National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
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changing times. In no case could the admonition of the great
Chief Justice be more appropriately heeded - '.. . we must never
forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.' 6

To which Justice Frankfurter replied in his dissent: "Precisely because 'it is a constitution we are expounding' ....
we
37
ought not to take liberties with it."
Similarly, Justice Goldberg concurring in Bell v. Maryland:38 "It was to guard against narrow conceptions that Chief
Justice Marshall admonished the Court never to forget 'that it is
a constituton we are expounding. . . a constitution intended to
endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs.'-31
And Justice Black (dissenting) responded: "We conclude as
we do because we remember that it is a constitution and that it
is our duty 'to bow with respectful submission to its provisions.'
The quotation from Justice Goldberg above directs attention to another famous line from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion - "a constitution intended to endure for ages to come."'
This was foreshadowed by Justice Story in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee42 and is a forerunner of Justice Holmes' living constitution.'

" Id. at 585-86 (original emphasis).
31 Id. at

647 (original emphasis). See STONE,

SEIDMAN, SUNSTEIN & TUSHNET, CONSTI-

TUTIONAL LAW 59 (1984).
3'

40

Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 315 (1964).
Id. at 315 (original emphasis).
Justice Black continued:

And in recalling that it is a Constitution 'intended to endure for ages to
come,' we also remember that the Founders wisely provided the means for that
endurance: changes in the Constitution, when thought necessary, are to be proposed by Congress or conventions and ratified by the States. The Founders gave
no such amending power to this Court.
Id. at 342.
4 M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 415.
" 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816).
43 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S at 433. See infra text accompanying notes 5 and 6
and infra text accompanying notes 142-46, 154-63. Less respectfully, Professor Philip B.
Kurland considers that ". . . whenever an opinion quotes Marshall"s dictum in
M'Culloch v. Maryland . . . you can be sure that the Court will be throwing the constitutional text, its history and its structure to the winds in reaching its conclusion." The
same, in his opinion, goes for a citation of Holmes dictum in Missouri v. Holland: "Once
more this means the Constitution is out the window." Kurland, Curia Regis: Some Corn-
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The Reparation case is now only forty years old and it
would be presumptuous to claim for it an impact anything like
that of M'Culloch. But it has had an effect and may well have
planted seeds for the future. The international personality of the
United Nations and other international organizations is now well
established 4 and the principle of implied powers has been followed in subsequent cases by the International Court. 5 In the
Administrative Tribunal Awards case'8 , the Court quoted from
Reparation and found the power of the General Assembly to
create a tribunal implied in its authority to establish staff regulations under Article 101 of the Charter.47 In the Certain Expenses case'8 , the Court employed a broader concept of implied
powers based on the general purposes and objectives of the Organization in the field of peace and security. The authority of
the General Assembly to establish a peace-keeping force was
rested on the purpose of the U.N. to maintain international
peace and security.'9
Before leaving for the moment M'Culloch and Reparation,
one should take a quick look at Judge Hackworth's opinion in
Reparation since it is reminiscent of the criticism levied at Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in M'Culloch. Judge Hackworth, in
disputing the power of the Organization to "sponsor private
claims" said:

ments on the Divine Right of Kings and Courts "to say what the law is," 23 ARIZ. L.
REv. 581, 591 (1981); See STONE & TUSHNET, supra note 37.
44 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt,
1980 I.C.J. 73, 89-90 (Advisory Opinion). See Jimbnez de Arbchaga, The Work and the
Jurisprudenceof the InternationalCourt of Justice 1947-1986, 58 B.Y.I.L. 2 (1987).
" International Status of South West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. at 128; Effect of Awards
of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J. 47,
56 (Advisory Opinion) [hereinafter Administrative Tribunal Awards case] Certain Expenses of the United Nations (art. 17, para. 2, of the Charter), 1962 I.C.J. 151 (Advisory
Opinion) [hereinafter Certain Expenses]; Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 16. See also advisory
opinions of the P.C.I.J., Competence of the ILO to Regulate Incidentally the Personal
Work of the Employer 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 13, at 18; 1 HUDSON, WORLD COURT
REPORTS 754-55; Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube, 1927 P.C.I.J.
4
(ser. B) No. 14, p. 3; 2 HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 167-8 (1927-32). See H.G.
SCHERMERS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW

208-211 (1980).

Administrative Tribunal Awards case, 1954 I.C.J. 39.
" Id. at 56-58.
4" See Certain Expenses, 1962 I.C.J. 151.
" Id. See Jimbnez de Arbchaga, supra note 44 at 3.
"

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol1/iss1/3
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There can be no gainsaying the fact that the Organization is
one of delegated and enumerated powers . . . Powers not expressed cannot freely be implied. Implied powers flow from a
grant of expressed powers, and are limited to those that are 'necessary' to the exercise of powers expressly granted. No necessity
for the exercise of the power here in question has been shown to
exist.50
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in M'Culloch had been
venomously attacked in letters to the Richmond Enquirer on,
among other grounds, that "necessary" in the Necessary and
Proper Clause of the Constitution meant absolute necessity. 1
Marshall had already anticipated this argument in the opinion
itself and had pointed out "that no word conveys to the mind, in
all situations, one single definite idea .... "52 In rejecting the
idea of absolute necessity, he referred to "a constitution intended to endure for ages to come" and continued: "It would
have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for
exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly,
and which can be best provided for as they occur."5
III.

A Look at Judicial Review

I will not pretend that there are the close parallels between
Marbury and Namibia that one finds between M'Culloch and
Reparation.Professor Jeffrey M. Shaman has said that Marbury
v. Madison "because it establishes the power of judicial review,
is generally agreed to be the most important decision ever rendered by the Supreme Court."5 Namibia too is a very important
constitutional decision, but for other reasons.
Neither the United States Constitution nor the United Nations Charter expressly provides for judicial review. Opinions
60Reparation case, 1949 I.C.J. at 198. See E. Lauterpacht, The Development of the
Law of International Organization by the Decisions of International Tribunals, 152
RECUEIL DES COURS,

377, 430-32 (IV 1976).

5. See G. GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENCE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 64
(1969).
52 M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 414. See Shaman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court,

and Creativity, 9

HASTINGS CONST.

L.Q. 257, 266 (1982);

BREST,

supra note 28, 206-07.

M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 415. See also, G. GUNTHER, supra note 51, at 103, 166-67.
(Marshall's replies to letters in the Richmond Enquirer).
" Shaman, supra note 52, at 262. But compare Frankfurter, supra note 31, at 219.
"

11
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differ on whether it is implicit in the Constitution or a judicial
creation of Chief Justice Marshall and the Supreme Court.5 5 In
either case it rests on the simple proposition that the Constitution is the supreme law and the Supreme Court, the highest judicial body in the United States, has not only the jurisdiction,
but the duty to apply the law. Much the same argument could
be made for the Charter. The Charter is the supreme or "higher
law" 56 and the International Court of Justice is "the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations. '57 Where the Court has
jurisdiction it is its duty to apply the law - "ay, there's the rub."
There are two obstacles as far as judicial review under the
Charter is concerned. The first, and most serious, is the lack of
compulsory jurisdiction for the Court, and the second is the San
Francisco Conference Statement on interpretation.5
The lack of compulsory jurisdiction is the most important
obstacle to judicial review by the International Court of Justice.
Where the Court has jurisdiction, it does not hesitate to interpret and apply relevant provisions of the Charter. The Committee of Jurists, set up by the Council of the League of Nations to
prepare a statute for the Permanent Court of International Justice, provided for compulsory jurisdiction in its draft. This provision, however, was deleted following discussion in the League
Council and Assembly.59 The Optional Clause of the present
Statute was substituted for a general compulsory jurisdiction
clause. The Optional Clause" worked well in the inter-war period when a substantial majority of the League Members deposited relatively unrestricted declarations accepting the jurisdic-

*1 Carter, ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary
Defence of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L. J. 821, 852 n.122 (1985); E. CHEMERINSKY,
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 18, 64 n.116 (1987); M. EDELMAN, DEMOCRATIC THEORIES
AND THE CONSTITUTION 23 (1984); Nagel, Interpretation and Importance in Constitutional Law: A Re-Assessment of Judicial Restraint, 25 NoMos: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 181
(1983); M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AN INQUIRY INTO
LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 12-16 (1982); Shaman,

supra note 52, at 262.
" U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
7 Id. at art. 92.
" Report of the Rapporteur of Committee IV/2, Doc. 933, IV/2/42(2), 13 U.N.C.I.O.
Docs. 703, 709 (1945) [hereinafter Report of the Rapporteur].
" Schwebel, Reflections on the Role of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 61 WASH.
L. REV. 1061, 1065 (1986).
60 Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, art. 36, para. 2.
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tion of the Court. Unfortunately, this favorable trend was not
continued and the "decline of the optional clause" has been a
cause for lament. 61 Today, less than one third of the parties to
the Statute of the International Court of Justice are bound by
declarations accepting compulsory jurisdiction under the Optional Clause and many of these, like the U.S. declaration before
2
its withdrawal, had crippling reservations.
A further limitation on the jurisdiction of the Court is
found in Article 34 of the Statute which provides that "[o]nly
states may be parties in cases before the Court."6 3 Leaving aside
the even more problematic question of access by individuals,
this provision is considered to exclude international organizations, including the United Nations itself, from being a party in
a contentious proceeding."'
In the absence of universal compulsory jurisdiction over
State members, and in the absence of the U.N. as a potential
party, it is difficult for the International Court to exercise a judicial review comparable to that established by Marbury v.
Madison.
The second obstacle to judicial review is the San Francisco
Statement on interpretation, included in the final report of
Committee IV/2 to the Conference which drafted the Charter.6 5
Suggestions had been made in the Committee that the International Court, as the principal judicial organ, or the General Assembly, as the organ in which all members are represented,
should be the competent organ to interpret the Charter; but

Waldock, Decline of the Optional Clause, 32 B.Y.I.L. 244 (1955-56); Schwebel,
supra note 59, at 1066.
2 See YEARBOOKS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. The most debilitating of
these limitations was the so-called Connally Amendment to the U.S. Declaration which
excluded "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United States of
America." Since reservations are reciprocal, any State could invoke this reservation
against the United States. See Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J.
9 (Judgment); Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (U.S. v. Bulgaria) 1960 I.C.J. 146, 147
(Order) (in which Bulgaria invoked the Connally Amendment and the U.S. withdrew its
application).
"' Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, art. 36, para. 2.
" During the drafting of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice it was suggested that Art. 34 would permit an International Organization, as an association of States, to be a party. However, the assumption today is to the contrary.
88 Report of the Rapporteur,supra, note 58.
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The San Francisco State-

Under unitary forms of national government the determination of such a [constiutional disputes] question may be vested in
the highest court or in some other national authority. However,
the nature of the Organization and of its operation would not
seem to be such as to invite the inclusion in the Charter of any
provision of this nature.6 7
The Statement does not, however, completely close the door
to judicial review. In the first place, it is after all only travaux
preparatoiresand, therefore, subject to the normal limitations
on its use."8 But, more important, the Statement itself suggests
uses of the Court in interpreting the Charter. It begins by pointing out that in the course of day to day operations, each organ,
such as the General Assembly, the Security Council and the International Court of Justice, will interpret such parts of the
Charter as are applicable to its particular functions. It notes
that "[t]his process is inherent in the functioning of any body
which operates under an instrument defining its functions and
powers." 69
In the United States, constitutional interpretation is not
limited to the Courts. Much of the development of the structure
and functions of government has evolved through interpretations and practices of Congress and the President, and from interactions between the legislative and executive departments."
Likewise, in the United Nations, during the nearly four and

66

Summary Report of 12th Meeting of Committee IV/2, IV/2/33, 13 U.N.C.I.O

Docs. 664, 633-35 (1945); Revised Summary Report of the 14th meeting of Committee
IV12 873, IV/2/37(1). 13 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 633-34, 653-54 (1945). Report of the Rapporteur
of Committee IV/2/33, Doc. 664, 13 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 633-34. 1-2 (1942); Report of the
Rapporteur of Committee IV/2/37(1), Doc. 873, 13 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 653-54 (1945). See
also excerpts in L. SOHN, CASES ON UNrrED NATIONS LAW 2-3 (1967).
67 Report of the Rapporteur, supra note 58, at 709, 7. While neither the U.S. Constitution nor the U.N. Charter has an express provision for settlement of constitutional
issues, the constitutions of some European countries and a number of Specialized Agencies in the U.N. family of International Organizations do specifically provide for such
settlement.
66 See infra text accompanying notes 201-04.
69 Report of the Rapporteur, supra note 58, at 709, 7.
7' Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 913
(1985); E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 22, 81, 97.
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one-half decades of its existence, interpretation of the Charter
through the practice of the General Assembly and the Security
Council has played a major role in the development of the
Organization.7 1
The Statement goes on to indicate that if there is a difference between two member States concerning an interpretation
of the Charter, they are free to submit the dispute to the International Court as in the case of any other treaty. It also notes
that the General Assembly or the Security Council may ask the
Court for an advisory opinion concerning the meaning of a provision of the Charter. Alternatively, the Statement suggests
other courses such as reference to an ad hoc committee of jurists
or to a joint conference.
The General Assembly in 1947, at its Second Session,
adopted a resolution recommending that organs of the United
Nations should refer to the International Court of Justice for
advisory opinion, questions of principle which are desirable to
have settled, including points of law relating to the interpretation of the Charter.7 2
There was objection to this provision by the Eastern European countries which argued that it would turn a permissive
provision into an obligatory one, that interpretation of the Char"

See

ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE

(1963).
G.A. Res. 171(A)(II). The operative paragraph of the Resolution is as follows:
Recommends that organs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies
should, from time to time, review the difficult and important points of law within
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice which have arisen in the
course of their activities and involve questions of principle which it is desirable to

POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

have settled, including points of law relating to the interpretationof the Charter

of the United Nations or the constitutions of the specialized agencies, and, if duly
authorized according to Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter, should refer them
to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion.
Id. (original & added emphasis). Resolution 3232(XXIX), on the same subject, adopted
at the 29th Session of the General Assembly in 1974, unfortunately, reflecting the trend
of the times, was considerably diluted. The relevant paragraph read:
Recommends that United Nations organs and the specialized agencies should,
from time to time, review legal questions within the competence of the International Court of Justice that have arisen or will arise during their activities and
should study the advisability of referring them to the Court for an advisory opinion, provided that they are duly authorized to do so; ....
G.A. Res. 3232(XXIX)(original emphasis). The specific reference to the Charter was not
included in the latter resolution.
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ter was a political question which should be left to the political
organs, and that it was doubtful if the phrase "any legal question" in Article 96 of the Charter included interpretations of the
Charter. 73 Mr. Vyshinsky, speaking for the Soviet Union, insisted that adoption of the provision in question "would really
mean that, whenever a question regarding the interpretation of a
particular paragraph of the Charter arises in the General Assembly or the Security Council, the International Court will, in fact,
be placed above the General Assembly and the Security Council." '7 The Assembly nevertheless approved the resolution by a
vote of forty-five to six, with three abstentions.7 5
Similar objections were raised with respect to the first request for an advisory opinion, but were given short shrift by the
International Court. The Court stated:
Lastly, it has been maintained that the Court cannot reply to
the question put because it involves an interpretation of the
Charter. Nowhere is any provision to be found forbidding the
Court, 'the principal judicial organ of the United Nations' to exercise in regard to Article 4 of the Charter, a multilateral treaty,
an interpretative function which falls within the normal exercise
of its judicial powers."
In fact, most of the requests for advisory opinions of the
International Court of Justice have involved interpretations of
the Charter. The first two expressly requested interpretations of
Article 4 on admission of new members. 77 Others, while not containing express requests concerning the meaning of the Charter,
required interpretations in order to give a decision on the question put to the Court? 8 The significance in this regard of
" See discussions in the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly, U.N.
GAOR at 96-97 (2d session), and in Plenary at 859-95 (1947). See L. SOHN, supra note
66, at 4-17.
71 L. SOHN, supra note 66, at 11.

11 Id. at 17.
76 Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article
4 of Charter), 1947-48 I.C.J. 57, 61. (Advisory Opinion).
7 Id.; Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the
United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4 (Advisory Opinion) [hereinafter Competence for

Admission].
71 Reparation case, 1949 I.C.J. at 174; International Status of South West Africa,
1950 I.C.J. at 128; Administrative Tribunal Awards case, 1954 I.C.J. at 47; African Vot-

ing case, 1955 I.C.J. at 67; 1956 I.C.J. 23 67; Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by
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Namibia is that the Court, despite its disclaimer, did review, in
detail, the validity and operative effect under the Charter of resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. 79 In
doing so, it upheld the validity and operative effect of General
Assembly Resolution 2145(XXI) terminating South Africa's
mandate over Namibia (formerly South West Africa), 0 and the
validity and binding effect of Security Council resolutions taken
pursuant to its residual powers under Article 24 of the Charter.81
This may not be judicial review in the sense of Marbury, but
judicial review none the less.
The obstacle is not a lack of authority in the Court to interpret the Charter, or to pronounce on the validity under the
Charter of an act of another organ in a case properly before it.
The problem is in the limited jurisdiction of the Court and in
the difficulty of getting a case involving a Charter issue properly
before it.
IV. Similarities and Differences in Fundamental Issues
Continuing our analogy, but with all due caveats, some of
the most fundamental constitutional issues, such as separation
of powers and federalism, find their counterparts in the United
Nations. These are problems for which there is no permanent
answer, but rather an ongoing struggle in which one, and then
another protagonist, may gain an advantage.
Considering first the separation of powers, take, for example, the foreign affairs power under the U.S. Constitution. Professor Louis Henkin has sketched the controversy that has existed from the time of Hamilton and Madison."2 The
the Committee on South West Africa, 1956 I.C.J. 23 (Advisory Opinion) [hereinafter
SWA Hearings of Petitioners]; Certain Expenses, 1962 I.C.J. at 151; Namibia, 1971
I.C.J. at 16; Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Advisory Opinion).
"' The Court also reviewed the validity of General Assembly Resolutions in the Certain Expenses case, supra note 45. The Court said: ". . . when the Organization takes
action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfillment of one of
the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such action is not
ultra vires the organization." Id. at 168.
o Namibia, 1962 I.C.J. at 45-50.
81 Id.
at 51-4.
81 Henkin, The Constitution and Foreign Affairs, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES

113, 118, 182 n.15 (Harmon 1978). See also J. CHOPER,

JUDICIAL

REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS, A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE
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Constitution itself lists certain powers of the President and certain powers of Congress in the field of foreign relations, but it
contains no general delegation of the foreign affairs power to either the executive or legislative branch. Hamilton argued that it
was part of the executive function as understood at the time
and, therefore, residual powers in foreign affairs were vested in
the President. Madison said the conduct of foreign relations had
belonged to the Continental Congress and, therefore, all powers
not specifically delegated to the President remained with Congress. The debate is still with us. For a time it seemed that an
"Imperial Presidency" had won the battle, but with Vietnam,
Watergate, and most recently the Iran-Contra affair, Congress
has reasserted its claims. A special prosecutor seems even to return to the position of Madison.
In the U.N., the General Assembly and the Security Council
have been the rival claimants, although the political powers of
the Secretary General have also been an issue.8 3 While the Assembly and Council of the League of Nations had been given
concurrent powers by the Covenant, "separation of powers" was
a leading concept of the Charter."' The U.N. General Assembly
was to be a "creative body" establishing principles while the Security Council was to be an organ of action carrying out those
principles."a
However, with the veto induced paralysis of the Security

ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 261-62 (1980); M. PERRY, supra note 55, at 56; E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 99-100; Nagel, supra note 55, at 198. See also Congress and the
Presidency: Invitation to Struggle, 499 ANNALS (Davidson 1988).
8' S. SCHWEBEL, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1952); I. CLAUDE,
SWORDS INTO PLOW SHARES, THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-

TION 206-12 (1971).
4 I. CLAUDE, supra note 83, at 175.
" The Chairman of the responsible committee at the San Francisco Conference described the respective functions of the General Assembly and the Security Council as

follows:
The Assembly, as the supreme representative body of the world, is to establish
principles on which world peace and the ideal of solidarity must rest; and, on the
other hand, the Security Council is to act in accordance with those principles and
with the speed necessary to prevent any attempted breach of international peace

and security. In other words, the former is a creative body and the latter an organ
of action.
Report of Committee 1112, Doc. 1151, 11/17, 8 U.N.I.C.O. Docs. 190, 196 (1945), quoted in
I. CLAUDE, supra note 83, at 176.
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Council during the early years of the cold war, the General Assembly successfully asserted, through Uniting for Peace,86 its
right to act when the Security Council was unable to do so. It
was the Assembly which created the first United Nations peacekeeping force (UNEF I) and established the structure and procedures for peace-keeping forces later utilized by the Security
Council." The International Court of Justice has given its imprimatur to this action by the Assembly in the following terms:
...the functions and powers conferred by the Charter on
the General Assembly are not confined to discussion, consideration, the initiation of studies and the making of recommendations; they are not merely hortatory. Article 18 deals with decisions of the General Assembly 'on important questions.' These
'decisions' do indeed include certain recommendations, but others
have dispositive force and effect."8
For a while the Assembly assumed a dominant position, but
this dominance was short lived. As the United States reassessed
its voting position, a new, but uneasy balance emerged.
Going next to aspects of federalism, we have under the U.S.
Constitution the question of states' rights8 9 and under the U.N.
Charter the problem of domestic jurisdiction 0 . Again, there is
no fixed resolution of these issues. Professor Inis Claude has
written: "The international battle over domestic jurisdiction
bids fair to be as permanent a feature of the constitutional history of the United Nations as the domestic battle over states'
rights has been in American history."9' 1
At the level of constitutional theory and judicial action in
the United States, the issue was early joined on the basic character of the Constitution.2 Counsel for Maryland, and those who
" G.A. Res. 377(V) of 3 Nov. 1950.
17 Resolutions of the First Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly,
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1), U.N. Doc. A/3354 (1956).
88 Certain Expenses, 1962 I.C.J. at 163 (emphasis added). See also Namibia, 1971
I.C.J. at 50.
89 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
90 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.

' I. CLAUDE, supra note 83, at 188. See B. COHEN, supra note 11, at 21-22.
92 Powell, supra note 70, at 887, 907, 924-35, 944-46; Simon, The Authority of the

Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretationbe Justified?, 73 CAIF.L.
REV. 1480, 1496 (1985). See also Murphy, The Art of Constitutional Interpretation, A
Preliminary Showing, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 132 (Har-
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attacked Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in letters to the Richmond Enquirer, asserted that the Constitution was a compact
among sovereign states; in other words, a contract or treaty.
Marshall maintained that it was not a compact but an instrument - a super-statute, emanating directly from the true sovereign, the People of the United States, as declared in the opening
line of the Preamble.
The political battle was waged through the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, the Hartford Convention of 1815,
the nullification crisis of 1828 to 1832, and eventually the secession of South Carolina and her sister states of the Confederacy
in 1861. It thus took better than Lincoln's four-score and seven
years and a civil war to settle the most basic conflict. While the
predominant position of the Federal Government and Marshall's
view of the Constitution are now secure, various federalism and
states' rights issues continue to assert themselves in political and
judicial arenas."'
The United Nations Charter, on the other hand, is of course
a treaty among sovereign States " and it is not seriously contended otherwise. Although the Preamble of the Charter opens
with the phrase "We the peoples of the United Nations," proposed by the United States delegation and inspired by our Constitution, little use has thus far been made of these words in
constitutional interpretation and development of the United Nations Charter.9" But, while the Charter is universally recognized
mon, 1978). Opsahl, An "InternationalConstitutional Law'? 10 INT'L. & CoMP. L.Q. 760,
771 (1961)(Opsahl considered that the United States Constitution was a treaty which
became something else).
93 See, Brest, supra note 28, at 233.
94 Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Charter states as a first Principle: "The Organization
is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." U.N. CHARTER art.
2, para. 1.
95 GOODRICH & HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, COMMENTARY AND DocuMENTS

20, 89 (2d ed. 1949). Macdonald, The United Nations Charter: Constitution or

Contract?,in THE

STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 889 (Macdonald & Johnston 1983). Referring to the

views of L. Ehrich, a Polish writer, he states:

. . he
b comes to the conclusion that the main purpose of this expression ['We
the Peoples of the United Nations'] is to give the Charter a solemn form and to
indicate that the Charter adopted a democratic principle according to which, during its interpretation, the will of the peoples living in the member states of the
United Nations must be taken into account.
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as a treaty, it is also recognized as a treaty having a very special
character.9 6 So the issue joined is not compact versus super-statute, but the effect of the special nature of the Charter on its
interpretation and development. e7
While nullification was resoundingly rejected in the federalstates controversy in the United States, it appears in various
forms and under different names in the relations of the United
Nations and its members. The most well known example is the
refusal of a number of U.N. members, including the United
States, to pay their legally binding assessments with the consequent financial crises of the Organization. 8 Another example in
the United States has been the refusal of lower courts to enforce
Charter obligations on the pretext of either non-self-executing
provisions or the rule of Whitney v. Robertson - treaties and
acts of Congress are on an equal footing and the last in point of
time prevails.99
In Diggs v. Schultz, before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Judge McGowan, in declining injunctive relief
to plaintiff-appellants who sought compliance with Security
Council sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, deplored the situation, but found no alternative. He said:

Id. at 890.
" The International Court of Justice in the Certain Expenses case, referred to the
Charter as "a multilateral treaty, albeit a treaty having certain special characteristics."
Certain Expenses, 1962 I.C.J. at 157. Even Eastern European writers who prefer not to
refer to the Charter as a constitution recognize that it is a special treaty sui generis. For
a summary of views, see Macdonald, supra note 95, at 889-92.
See infra text accompanying notes 254-63.
"8 See Zoller, The "Corporate Will" of the United Nations and the Rights of the
Minority, 81 A.J.I.L. 610-34 (1987). Professor Zoller in her prize winning article, after
demonstrating that treaty law can not justify the withholding of contributions, puts forward a very dangerous theory of an inherent right of nullification in member States
based on the horizontal nature of the international legal order. Id. at 630-34. But the
purpose of the Charter was to introduce a vertical element, however minimal, in the
traditional legal order. Professor Zoller's thesis would be as destructive to the United
Nations as nullification would have been destructive of the United States.
" Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). For an example of a court refusing to
apply the human rights provisions of the Charter on the grounds that they were non-self
executing see Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d. 718; 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952). However, the
Court by applying the Fourteenth Amendment, reached the same result as the lower
court had reached by applying the Charter. See Sei Fujii v. California, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1950). See Schachter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human
Rights Provisions in American Law, 4 VANDERBILT L. REV. 643-59 (1951).
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We think that there can be no blinking the purpose and effect of the Byrd Amendment. It was to detach this country from
the U.N. boycott of Southern Rhodesia in blatant disregard of our
treaty undertakings. The legislative record shows that no member
of Congress voting on the measure was under any doubt about
what was involved then; and no amount of statutory interpretation now can make the Byrd Amendment other than what it was
when presented to the Congress, namely, a measure which would
make, and was intended to make, the United States a certain
treaty violator.' 00

Several European countries now recognize that treaty obligations prevail over their national laws and even over their constitution. Suggestions have been made that it is time that the
U.S. Supreme Court took a new look at the rule of Whitney v.
Robertson.' It has been argued, correctly in my view, that the
Constitution does not require the result reached in that case. A
reworking of the rule would enable the United States to function
more responsibly in our modern interdependent world. If the
at least
Court is not yet prepared to overrule Whitney, it might
02
Charter.1
Nations
United
the
for
exception
an
make
Before the International Court of Justice, of course, national laws and constitutional provisions would be no excuse for
the violation of international obligations. 0 ' The Court, like
Chief Justice Marshall in the second part of M'Culloch, would

100

Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461 at 465 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

101

See Sohn, Panel: New Departures in the Law of Sovereign Immunity, 63 PROC.

AM. Soc. INT'L L. 180 (1969); HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 163-64
(1972); HENKIN, PUGH, SCHACHTER & SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS
207 (1987). Stein, Toward Supremacy of Treaty-Constitutionby JudicialFiat: On the
Margin of the Costa Case, 63 MICH. L. REv. 491 (1965): "Theoretically, if the concept of
'higher law' [with respect to treaties] were to prevail completely, this treaty supremacy
should extend not only to preexisting but also to subsequent federal law. Both Jefferson
and Jay assumed this to be the case." Id. at 505. Robert B. Rosenstock, in his lecture,
raised the question whether it was not time to take a fresh look at the question, Lecture
by Robert B. Rosenstock, Blaine Sloan Lecture in International Law, Pace University
School of Law, White Plains, N.Y. (Apr. 14, 1988).
102 However, this point was raised in Diggs v. Schultz and rejected by the Court of
Appeals, Diggs, supra note 100, 465 n.4.

,o Art. 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that "A party
may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform
a treaty ....
" This is a statement of general international law on the subject. See statement of Charles Evans Hughes, then Secretary of State and about to become Chief Jus-

tice, 5 HACKWORTH,

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
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not hesitate to review the effects of such legislation against
Charter obligations in a case where it had jurisdiction and the
issue was properly joined.' °4 But, the result would be a finding
that the State had violated its obligations under the Charter, not
that the national law was void." 5
With respect to secession, the ultimate and most drastic of
states' rights claims, neither the U.S. Constitution nor the U.N.
Charter provide for withdrawal. For the United States, the question was decided on the field of battle. For the United Nations,
there is the declaration adopted by the San Francisco Conference which disclaims any "purpose of the Organization to compel [a] Member to continue its cooperation in the Organization."' 1 6 The declaration
indicates certain exceptional
circumstances in which withdrawal might be envisaged,'10 7 but
also "deems that the highest duty of the nations which will become Members is to continue their cooperation within the Organization for the preservation of international peace and security."' 08 It concludes that "[i]t is for these considerations that the
Committee has decided to abstain from recommending insertion
in the Charter of a formal clause specifically forbidding or per104 In the Case Concerning Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 32-35, 92-97, 146 (Merits), the Court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the Charter obligations because of the multilateral treaty reservation made by the United States in its acceptance of the Optional Clause. However, the
Court considered the nearly parallel, but not identical, obligations under general international law.
105 Virally, The Sources of InternationalLaw in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 116 at 170-71 (Sorensen 1968). See Stein, supra note 101, at 509-13. Professor Stein
notes that the position is different in the European Court of Justice where a national law
in conflict with Community law is invalid. He comments that:
• . .it is perhaps the first time in history that a court established by an international treaty has asserted its power to determine, with effect not only in the 'international' (or Community) legal order but also in national law, the hierarchical
value of the very norm to which it owes its existence.
Id. at 513.
100 Report of the Rapporteur of Committee 1/2 on Chapter III (Membership), Doc.
1178, 1/2/76(2), 7 U.N.C.I.O Docs. 324 at 328, 5 (1945) [hereinafter Report of Committee
1/2].
'07These circumstances are: 1) if the Organization was unable to maintain peace or
could do so only at the expense of law and justice; 2) if the rights and obligations of a
member are changed by an amendment in which it had not concurred and which it was
unable to accept; or 3) if an amendment accepted by the Assembly or a general conference failed to secure the necessary ratifications.
'8 Report of Committee 1/2, supra note 106 at 328, 5.

23

PACE YB. INT'L L.

[Vol. 1:61

' 9
mitting withdrawal.' 10
Some have interpreted this declaration as establishing an
absolute right of withdrawal, but this is not supported by either
the text or, fortunately, the very limited practice. In the case of
Indonesia's purported withdrawal in 1965, the Secretary- General was careful only to note Indonesia's letter and to express
"the earnest hope that in due time it will resume full cooperation with the United Nations." 0 When, in the following year,
after a change in government, Indonesia expressed the intention
"to resume full cooperation with the United Nations," it was
welcomed back without going through the admission process. 1
The conclusion that should be drawn is that while the United
Nations would not, and in fact in current circumstances could
not, use force to compel continued cooperation, a right of withcircumstances set
drawal exists, if at all, only in the exceptional
1 2
forth in the San Francisco Declaration.
With respect to the subject of federalism, similarities thus
far have related more to the issues than to their resolution.
However, reverting to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, the
claim of domestic jurisdiction has not proved a serious impediment to discussion and even action by United Nations organs. In
fact, enforcement action is expressly excluded from its application. Building on the Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court
of International Justice in the Nationality Decrees case," 3 to
the effect that domestic jurisdiction is a relative term, the
United Nations has overridden objections of colonial powers in
order to deal decisively with the matter of non-self-governing
territories and has established, beyond effective dispute, that

10I
11

Id. at

392, 6.
U.N. Doc. S/6202 (1965). The right of Indonesia to withdraw was questioned by a

few members. See letter from the U.K., U.N. Doc. S/6229 (1965).
.. U.N. Doc. A/6419 (1966); U.N. Doc. S/7498 (1966); U.N. Doc. A/PV/1420 at 2
(1966)(I wrote the scenario reflecting the consensus of the members for Indonesia's return to full cooperation).
112 See Schwelb, Withdrawal from the United Nations: the Indonesia Intermezzo,
61 A.J.I.L. 661, 671-72 (1967). Even if a State were to withdraw from the U.N. it would
still be subject to action under Art. 2(6) which provides: "The Organization shall ensure
that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these
Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and
security." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 6.
"' Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4,
23-24 (Advisory Opinion); 1 HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 143-62.
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human rights are a subject of international concern. 11 4 Thus, Article 2(7) has not been a serious obstacle to United Nations action in these fields. Predominant power, however, remains with
the member States.
V.

Approaches to Interpretation

It is now time to look at theories of, and approaches to interpretation as they apply first, to the U.S. Constitution and second, to treaties. After that we will see how these theories and
approaches may be applicable to the U.N. Charter. There is a
vast sum of literature relating to constitutional interpretation' 6

" Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania, First
Phase, 1950 I.C.J. 65 (Advisory Opinion) [hereinafter Peace Treaties]. See Jimknez de
Ar6chaga, supra note 44, at 3-6.
"0 See C. ANTIEAU, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1982); S. BARBER, ON WHAT THE
CONSTITUTION MEANS (1984); InterpretationSymposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277-398, 551700 (1985); R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation
Decision, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1, 1-65 (1955); Bork, Neutral Principles and some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Brest, supra note 28; Carter, supra note 55;
E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55; J. CHOPER, supra note 82; Clinton, Judges Must Make
Law: A Realistic Appraisal of the Judicial Function in a Democratic Society, 67 IOWA
REV. 711 (1982); E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY (1920); R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Edelman, supra note 55; P. EIDELBERG, THE

L.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION

(1986); J.

ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST,

A

THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Epstein, Lopez, Pitkin, Tribe, Van Alstyne & Kaufman, The Idea of the Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 153 (1987); Fairman, Does the

Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding,2
STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949); FRIED, Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framers Intention, 100 HARV. L. REV. 751, 760 (1987); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,

27

STAN.

L.

REV.

703, 718 (1975);

ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

(Harmon 1978); H. HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1925); Koffier, Book Review, 1 PACE L. REV. 403 (1980)(reviewing J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
(1980)); Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972);
LLewellyn, The Constitutionas an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934); L. LUSKY, BY
WHAT RIGHT?

A

COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO REVISE THE CONSTITU-

(1975); Lynch, Book Review, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 537 (1984)(reviewing M. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982)); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981); W. MURPHY, J. FLEMING & W. HARRIS, II, AMERICAN
TION

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

(1986); Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean

what it always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (1977); Nagel, supra note 55; M. PERRY,
supra note 55; Powell, supra note 70; Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution,
54 TEx. L. REV. 693 (1976); Shaman, supra note 52; Simon, supra note 92; L. TRIBE,
CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES

(1985); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of

Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
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and very extensive material on treaty interpretation."1 ' The
treaty material in the more recent past has been directed towards formulating principles of interpretation, while current
constitutional debate concerns as much the legitimacy of judicial
"' See Berglin,

Treaty Interpretationand the Impact of ContractualChoice of Fo-

rum Clauses on the Jurisdictionof InternationalTribunals: The IranianForum Clause
Decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J. 39 (1985); YiTING CHANG, THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES BY JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS (1933); Degan,
Attempts to Codify Principles of Treaty Interpretation and the South- West Africa
Case, 8 IND. INT'L L.J. 9 (1968); Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 28
BYI.L. 1 (1951); Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of
Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points, 33 B.Y.I.L. 203 (1957);
Fitzmaurice, Vae Victis or Woe to the Negotiators Your Treaty or our "Interpretation"
of it?, 65 A.J.I.L. 358 (1971); JudicialInnovation - Its Uses and Its Perils - As exemplified in some of the Work of the International Court of Justice during Lord McNair's
Period of Office, in CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 24-47 (1965); Gross, Treaty
Interpretation:The Proper Role of an International Tribunal, 63 PRoc. Am. Soc. INT'L
L. 1, 118-22 (1969); Gottlieb, The Interpretationof Treaties by Tribunals, 63 PROc. AM.
Soc. INT'L L. 1, 122-31; HUDSON, PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942
551-73 (1943); Jacobs, Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With Special
Reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treatis before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 18 INT'L & CoUp. L.Q. 318 (1969); Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on
Treaties, 64 A.J.I.L. 495, 518-21 (1970); H. Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretationand
the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 B.Y.I.L. 48 (1949),
M. McDOUGAL, H.

LASSWELL, &

J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS

WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND PROCEDURE

(1967);

AND

LORD McNAIR,

THE LAW OF TREATIES 364-489 (1961); Pratap, Interpretationof Treaties - Use of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Materials,in ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 55-69 (Agrawala 1972);

Falk, On Treaty Interpretationand the New Haven Approach:Achievements and Prospects, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 95-137 (Agrawala 1972); Jagota, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 179-96
(Agrawala 1972); Schwarzenberger, Myths and Realities of Treaty Interpretation,Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 71-94 (Agrawala 1972); see also 22 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 205-27 (KEETON
& SCWARZENBERGER 1969); ROSENNE, Interpretation of Treaties in the Restatement and
the InternationalLaw Commission's Draft Articles: A Comparison, 5 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 205 (1966); SHARMA, The ILC Draft and Treaty Interpretation with Special
Reference to Preparatory Works, 8 IND. INT'L L.J. 367 (1968); SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (2d ed 1984); Vienna Conference on the
Law of Treaties, 19 INT'L,& Comp. L.Q. 47 (1970); SORENSEN, LES SOURCES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1946); Stone, Fictional Elements in Treaty Interpretation - A Study in
the InternationalJudicial Process, 1 SYDNEY L. REV. 344 (1955); Vierdag, The Law Governing Treaty Relations between Parties to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and States not Party to the Convention, 76 A.J.I.L. 779 (1982); Wright, The Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties, 23 A.J.I.L. 94 (1929); TSUNE-CHI Yu, THE
INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES (1927). For some other early writings on treaty interpretation see Pollux (Hamnbro), The Interpretation of the Charter, 23 B.Y.I.L. 54, 55 n.3
(1946).
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review in relation to majoritarian democracy as it does methods
of constitutional interpretation. This concentration on the
proper judicial role has its disadvantages in difining methods of
constitutional construction since interpretation is not confined
to courts but is a normal function of all branches of government.'17 The material relating to treaty interpretation is not so
limited. Only the 1956 Resolution of the Institut de Droit International makes a distinction between interpretation by judicial
bodies and by other decision makers."
A.

Constitutional Construction

Various classifications have been offered in analyzing approaches to constitutional interpretation."1 " Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky in his recent book on Interpreting the Constitution lists literalism or textualism,"0 originalism, 2 ' conceptualism (moderate originalism),1

s

culture values theories,'

process-

based modernism,'" and his own theory of open-ended
" E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 22. Professor Chemerinsky points out that
this concentration on the proper judicial function at the very least "is undesirable because regardless of the judicial role, there is a need to determine the proper method for
Congress, the president, and state governments to use in interpreting the Constitution."
Id. at 22. See also Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,58 S. CAL.L. REv. 603, 619 (1985).
"' See infra text accompanying note 191.
"' See S. BARBER, supra note 115, at 9-10 (textual, intentions of framers, present or
emergent consensus, ideas of social progress, naturally right, etc. and his own "aspirational" combination of other approaches); Brest, supra note 28, at 204-05 (originalism
including strict textualism and strict intentionalism, moderate originalism, and nonoriginalism); E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 108-09.
I am using the term interpretationbroadly although I am aware that there are various narrower uses of the word. For example, Nagel, supra note 55, distinguishes practice
from interpretation. He writes: "Much of the Constitution draws its meaning from practice rather than from interpretation." Id. at 187. Michaels gives an even narrower definition: interpretation means considering the original intentions. Michaels, Response to
Perry and Simon, 58 S.CAL. L. REv. 673 (1985). See Simon, supra note 117, at 620 n.16,
622 n.18; E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 60-61.
"0Chemerinsky gives Justice Hugo Black as an example. See E. CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 55, at 108.
" Id. at 178 (referring to Raoul Berger and Chief Justice Rehnquist). Others, such
as Judge Bork and Monaghan, could be added.
Id. at 178-79 nn.14 & 15 (citing to Dworkin).
Id. at 179 nn.17-20 (citing to Conkle, Lupu, Moore, Perry, Simon, Wellington &
White).
" Id. at 109 n.21 (citing to Ely).

27

PACE Y.B. INT'L L.

[Vol. 1:61

modernism. 2 '
Professor Chemerinsky defines literalism as "the view that
all constitutional interpretation must be based solely on the constitutional text.'

126

Since literalism carries a connotation of

strict adherence to the plain meaning rule, textualism is perhaps
a preferable term emphasizing reliance on the text but being less
confining than a strict literalism.
Originalism is defined as a theory which "accords binding
authority to the text or the intention of its adopters.' ' 12 7 It thus

combines textualism with intentionalism and does not directly
address the issue which has been foremost in the debates over
treaty interpretation between adherents to the text and adherents to actual intent. 128
Conceptualism, otherwise termed moderate originalism, "requires the Court to determine the underlying purpose of a constitutional provision and to apply this purpose in developing
modern governing principles.

' 12 9

Professor Dworkin's distinction

between broad concepts of the framers and more specific conceptions of present day interpreters is a leading example.13 0 To
the extent that emphasis is placed on purpose, there is a teleological aspect to conceptualism."'
Under the culture values theories, the Court uses basic social values not expressed in the text as a basis for constitutional
decision making.3

2

Such values are variously derived from tradi-

1

Id. at 109.

"

Id. at 108.
Id. See also Brest's discussion of originalism, Brest supra note 28, at 205-09, 222-

'27

23.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 190-91, 194-204. Monaghan, supra note 115,
says that "A distinction is sometimes posited between textual analysis and original intent inquiry such that only the constitutional text and not 'parol evidence' can be examined to ascertain constitutional meaning. But any such distinction seems entirely
wrong." Id. at 374 (citing Brest, supra note 28, at 205-13). See Chief Justice Marshall in
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), to the effect that the text is the best
evidence of intent "must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense,
and to have intended what they said." Id. at 188. However, where the actual intent of
the framers can be ascertained it would seem that for most originalists intent would
control.
12
E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 108.
R. DWORKIN, supra note 115, at 134-36.
'3' See infra text accompanying note 178.
132 E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 109.
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tion, moral
consensus, natural law and similar extrinsic
33

sources.1
Process based modernism, as formulated by Dean Ely, "permits the Court to decide cases based on contemporary values
but limits such discretion to improving the process of government by ensuring fair representation or adjudication."' 3 4
And finally, Professor Chemerinsky's own open-ended modernism is "an approach that permits the Court to give meaning
to all constitutional provisions on the basis of contemporary values that the justices regard as worthy of constitutional
protection."' 3 5
While in the past, discussion has often been in terms of
strict and liberal construction, expansive and restrictive interpretation, and judicial activism and restraint, the current lines
are between originalist and non-originalist, interpretivists and
non-interpretivists, and constructionists and non or deconstructionists. 136
For an originalist, such as Judge Robert Bork, constitutional
interpretation should rest on the intent of the framers and ratifiers which is to be discerned from text, history, structure and
precedent.3 7 In order to ensure the application of neutral principles "[tihe judge must stick close to the text and the history,
38
and their fair implications, and not construct new rights."'
Non-originalists doubt both the practicality and desirability
of relying on original intent. They first ask whose intent is relevant, the drafters (framers), the ratifiers in the various state
conventions and legislatures, the states or ultimately the people?
Secondly, does one look for a specific or a general intent, or for a

"' Id. at 179 nn.18-20 (citing Lupu, White, Moore & Wellington).
supra note 55, at 109.
"' Professor Chemerinsky adds: "Under open-ended modernism, the Constitution is
viewed as outlining basic concerns - separation of powers, freedom of speech, protection
of criminal defendants - and the Court in each generation is entrusted to give content
and meaning to them in their application to contemporary situations." Id.
...See Brest, supra note 28, at 205; Linde, supra note 115, at 254-55; Moore, A
Natural Law Theory of Interpretation,58 S.CAL. L. REV. 279; M. PERRY, supra note 55,
at 10; Simon, supra note 117, at 619.
...Speech by Judge Robert H. Bork before the Supreme Court Historical Society,
May 6, 1983, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 21 (mimeo). See also Bork, supra note
115, at 17.
38 Bork, supra note 115, at 8.
134 E. CHEMERINSKY,
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functional equivalent; or, was there in fact no common intent, or
an intent to leave decisions to future interpreters?'
All the
usual difficulties with legislative history are compounded by distance in time. It is suggested that to understand the intentions
of people living two hundred years ago, one must transpose the
interpreter from his time and circumstances to those of the
framers or, conversely, transpose the framers to the time of the
interpreter." 0 If all these difficulties are overcome, the nonoriginalist will still maintain that it is undesirable that present
generations should be bound by the "dead hand of the past;"
that decisions, rather, should be based on present values, not
those of two hundred or even one hundred years ago."'
Emphasis of the non-originalist is on the concept of a living
constitution and the need for it to evolve with our evolving civilization. But even originalists do not reject altogether the concept of growth. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in 1976 that he
accepted Justice Holmes' conception of a living constitution. He
comments:
The framers of the Constitution wisely spoke in general language and left to succeeding generations the task of applying that
language to the unceasing changing environment in which they
would live. Those who framed, adopted, and ratified the Civil
War amendments to the Constitution likewise used what have
been aptly described as 'majestic generalities.'42
What he rejected was the idea that judges may impose their
own moral values, going beyond even a generously fair reading of
the language and intent of the Constitution. " "
Judge Bork would save Brown v. Board of Education by
13

Brest, supra note 28, at 214-16; Shaman, supra note 52, at 267-68; Bennett, The

Mission of Moral Reasoning in Constitutional Law, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 647-59 (1985); E.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 49-50; I. ELY, supra note 115, at 17; Simon, supra note
117, at 636-45.
140 See Carter, supra note 55; Simon, supra note 117, at 639; Tushnet, supra note
115, at 800-02.
141 E. CHEMERINSKY supra note 55, at 53-54, 122-23; Moore, supra note 136, at 35258; Munzer & Nickel, supra note 115, at 1031-33; Shaman, supra note 52, at 267-72;
Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 551, 592. Compare Stone, supra note 116, at 351 (citing
Sir Eric Beckett).
14I Rehnquist, supra note 115, at 694.
1.. Id. at 704.
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finding a "core meaning" in the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 14 4 Also, in addition to the "specific values that text and history show the framers actually to have ingovernmental processes
tended," he would derive rights "from
5
Constitution.""
the
by
established
Moreover, originalists do not deny that value choices must
be made, but believe that these should properly be left to the
politically responsible departments of government. As Professor
Perry points out, they would distinguish the sustaining of electively accountable policy choices, on the one hand, from the
striking down of a policy choice made by an electively accountable body on the other."
While originalist and non-originalists agree that many, if
not most, of the important constitutional decisions of this century can not be adequately supported on originalist or even on
interpretivists terms, the courts speak in constitutional language. Professor Larry Simon has contended that ". . . the language of so many provisions of the Constitution permits such an
enormous range of meanings consistent with their languagemeanings that an interpreter would rarely, if ever, have to violate the document's language-meaning in order to reach a partic1 7
ular outcome."
An approach utilizing terminology employed by the Court
will be found in Professor Charles James Antieau's book on Constitutional Construction published in 1982. Professor Antieau
has anaiyzed and classified pronouncements of courts on constitutional issues." 8 In his second chapter, this analysis is organized under fifty Guides or Canons of Construction. These start
with the plain meaning rule," 9 run through such well-known
maxims as ejusdem generis'50 and expressio unius est exclusio
alterius,'51 various degrees of liberal and restrictive interpretaBork, supra note 115, at 14.
"4

Id. at 17.

'"

M. PERRY, supra note 55, at 33.

Simon, supra note 117, at 620. He adds: "All Supreme Court opinions of which I
am aware give meaning to the Constitution and are consistent with its language-meaning, or at least could be rewritten to be 'interpretivist' in these senses." Id. at 622.
"4
C. ANTIEAU, supra note 115.
Id. at 11.
1 0 Id. at 28.
1"7

" Id. at 29.
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tion, including the principle of effectiveness,' 5 2 and conclude
with a teleological approach. 8 As is always the case, one can
find within this wealth of material a maxim for almost every side
and nuance of a question.
I will deal with only three of many possible points; points
which are not only closely related to each other, but also to the
subject of this paper. The first is the idea already mentioned,
that of a living constitution. We have noted that even originalists, such as Chief Justice Rehnquist and Judge Bork, must
make some concessions to this principle."" Of course, there are
contrary views. Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 55
referring to the possibility of amending the Constitution, said:
".. . but while it remains unaltered, it must be construed now
as it was at the time of its adoption."'5 6
And Justice Sutherland, dissenting in Home Building and
57 contended that: "The whole aim of
Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell1
construction, as applied to a provision of the Constitution, is to
to the intent,
discover the meaning, to ascertain and give effect
58
it."'
adopted
who
people
the
and
framers
its
of
Alexander Bickel writing in 1955, after quoting the above,
remarked: "Of course, such views, when they prevail, threaten
59
disaster to government under a written constitution.'

I" Id. at 18, 33, 36.
Id. at 51. See also id. at 23, 26. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941):
• . .in determining whether a provision of the Constitution applies to a new
subject matter, it is of little significance that it is one with which the framers were
not familiar. For in setting up an enduring framework of government they undertook to carry out for the indefinite future and in all the vicissitudes of the changing affairs of men, those fundamental purposes which the instrument itself discloses. Hence we read its words, not as we read legislative codes which are subject
to continuous revision with the changing course of events, but as the revelation of
the great purposes which were intended to be achieved by the Constitution as a
continuing instrument of government . . .If we remember that 'it is a constitution we are expounding;' we cannot rightly prefer, of the possible meanings of its
words, that which will defeat rather than effectuate the constitutional purpose.
Id. at 316 (original emphasis).
'" See infra text accompanying notes 142-46.
165 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
116Id. at 426.
153

157

290 U.S. 398 (1934).

I" Id. at 453.
'59Bickel, supra note 115, at 3.
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Chief Justice Warren in Brown v. Board of Education,16
said: " . . . we can not turn back the clock to 1868 when the

Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written." 161
And Chief Justice Hughes in Blaisdell ' 2 declared:
If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time
of its adoption it means today, it is intended to say that the great
clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation
which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time,
would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own
refutation. 6"
While cases and learned argument can also be cited against
an evolutionary approach, there can be no doubt that the Constitution has evolved and will continue to evolve through judicial
interpretation and governmental practice.
Which brings me to my second point, that practice has an
important role to play in interpretation. Several of Professor Antieau's Guides or Canons relate to usage or practice in constitu0 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"I Id. at 492. Compare with Statement of Monroe Leigh, then Legal Adviser of the
State Department, the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly on 14 Nov.
1975, 74 DRP'T ST. BULL. 119 (No. 1909 Jan. 26, 1976)("That accomplishment was not
simply to provide a charter to deal with the contingencies of 1946; it was farsighted
enough to provide our basic guidelines for the future by allowing scope for historical
change."). Earlier in the same speech he stated: "The charter was conceived as a document which could stand the test of time by growing with evolving needs. It was conceived not merely as a constitutive treaty, but as a constitutional instrument . . . the
language of the charter permits important evolutionary changes without requiring textual changes." Id. at 118-19.
101 Blainsdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
108 Id. at 442. Chief Justice Hughes added: "It was to guard against such a narrow
conception that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning - 'We must never
forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.'" Id. at 443 (original emphasis). See
also Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Justice McKenna stated: "Time works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must
be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth." Id. at 373. See
also, B. CORDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 17 (1921)("The greast generalities of the Constitution have a content and significance that vary from age to age." as
quoted by Justice Blackmun in his dissenting opinion in Bakke, supra note 34). On a
living constitution see H. MCBAIN, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (1927); Llewellyn, supra
note 115; Reich, The living Constitution and the Court's Role, in HUGO BLACK AND THE
SUPREME COURT 133 (Strickland 1967); Miller, Notes on the Concept of the "Living Constitution", 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 881 (1963); but compare Miller, Change and The Constitution, 1970 L. & Soc. ORDER 231-54.
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tional construction. 1" While the Supreme Court has never considered itself bound by congressional or executive practice, it has
on occasion given considerable weight to such usage. Justice
Frankfurter, speaking for the Court in Inland Waterways Corp.
v. Young"0 5 said: "Even constitutional power, when the text is
doubtful, may be established by usage." '
A very interesting non-judicial example relates to our friend
from M'Culloch, the Bank of the United States. Madison, as a
member of the House of Representatives in the first Congress,
opposed on constitutional grounds the establishment of the First
Bank, but as President, twenty years later, he signed into law
the act creating the Second Bank. He defended the seeming inconsistency on the ground that a construction by usage and precedent should override the intellectual scruples of the individual."' 7 In a letter to Judge Spencer Roane in 1819, he stated:
It could not but happen, and was foreseen at the birth of the
Constitution, that difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms and phrases necessarily used
in such a charter.

. .

and that it might require a regular course of

practice to liquidate and settle the meaning of some of them.6 8

My third point relates to structural interpretation. Professor Charles Black, in his book Structure and Relationship in
M

C. ANTINEAU, supra note 115 at 44-8.

309 U.S. 517 (1940).
Id. at 525. See also Youngston Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Justice Frankfurter stated:
It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to
confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life
has written upon them. In short, a systematic, unbroken executive practice, long
pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in
by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making it as it
were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be
treated as a gloss on 'Executive Power' vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.
Id. at 610-11, quoted in C. ANTIEAU, supra note 115, at 44, 47. See also Stuart v. Laird, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 472- 73;
(1915); Dames v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981); CORWIN, supra note 115, at 93 (1973
ed).
167 See Powell, supra note 70, at 939-40. President Andrew Jackson, however, was
not impressed by this practice and vetoed, on constitutional grounds, a bill rechartering
the Bank. Veto Message of July 10, 1832 in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
576, 581-82 (Richardson 1896). See Shaman, supra note 52, at 276.
100 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 143, 145 (1865), quoted in
100

Powell, supra note 70, at 941.
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Constitutional Law, developed the theory that constitutional
rules may be inferred from structural relationships established
by the Constitution."" It is suggested, for example, that at least
the second part of M'Culloch, holding that Maryland could not
tax the Bank, rested on inferences from the structure of the fed1 70
eral system and not at all on the text of the Constitution.
Another example is Crandall v. Nevada,17 1 striking down a
Nevada tax on persons leaving the state. "[R]elying on the
structure of the federal system, it developed an account of membership in the national polity which included a right to travel
unimpeded from any state to the seat of the national
1 72
government.
Structural interpretation, of course, permits alternative inferences depending on the outlook of the interpreter.1 73 Views of
constitutional structure by an advocate of states' rights will produce far different inferences from those drawn by Chief Justice
Marshall in M'Culloch or by Justice Miller in Crandall v.
Nevada.
B.

Treaty Interpretation

The question of the interpretation of treaties was described
by the President of the Vienna Conference as "the most controversial and difficult subject in the whole field of the law of treaties. '174 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice had earlier called it a "subject of
"I C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). See
Brest, supra note 28, at 217-18; Munzer & Nickel, supra note 115, at 1051-52; Carter,
supra note 55, at 864, 867; Monaghan, supra note 115, at 361; Nagel, supra note 55, at
183; Powell, supra note 70, at 888. See also W. MURPHY & W. HARRIS, supra note 115, at
398-401.
170

Brest, supra note 28, at 217.

73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868). See Brest, supra note 28, at 217-18; Munzer &
Nickel, supra note 115, at 1051-52.
'

I" Munzer & Nickel, supra note 115, observe that:

An advantage to Black's approach over [appeals to the broad intent of the framers] is that it can accommodate shifts in perceptions of the kind of government
that we are trying to have - for example, the more democratic idea of government

that has emerged in the last century - and hence justify a different set of rights
from those that could be based on appeal to the broad intent of the framers.
Id. at 1052.
"I Brest, supra note 28, at 218.
.7,U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Second Session Official Records, Vienna, 9 Apr.-22 May 1969, Summary Records of Plenary Meetings and Meetings of the
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acute debate and controversy."17' And Lord McNair opened the

pertinent chapter of his book The Law of Treaties with the
statement: "There is no part of the law of treaties which the text
writer approaches with more trepidation than the question of
interpretation.

17 6

It was therefore with considerable satisfaction that, despite
controversy continuing through the discussions in its Committee
of the Whole, the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties was
able in plenary session to adopt unanimously the International
Law Commission Articles on interpretation. 17

It

may be

doubted, however, that controversies are at an end. The question now is - how do you interpret the Articles on
interpretation?
Main approaches to treaty interpretation have been classified as (1) textual, (2) subjective (intention of the parties), and
(3) teleological. 178 A principal difference between the textual approach, which looks to the text for the intention of the parties,
and the subjective approach, in which intent is distinct from the
text, is in the role assigned to travaux preparatoires.In the teleological approach the emphasis is on the general object and purpose of the treaty.
Committee of the Whole, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/11/Add.1, 59 [hereinafter Plenary
Meetings].
'71 Fitzmaurice,
The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice
1951-1954: Treaty Interpretation and other Treaty Points, 33 B.Y.I.L. 203, 204 (1957).
LORD McNAIR, supra note 116, at 364. But see SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note
174

116, at 71, 205.
177

Plenary Meetings, supra note 174, at 57-9.

'T'

The ILC noted these as follows:

Jurists ...differ to some extent in their basic approach to the interpretation
of treaties according to the relative weight which they give to: (a) The text of the
treaty as the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties; (b) The intentions of the parties as a subjective element distinct from the text, and (c) The
declared or apparent objects and purposes of the treaty.
See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of the Second Part of
the Seventeenth Session, Monaco, 3-28 January 1966, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1, 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 169, 218 (1966), reprinted in 61 A.J.I.L. 248 at 349 (1967) [hereinafter
ILC Report]. The teleological approach, (c) above, is sometimes also called the functional approach. See Official Records of the Vienna Conference, First Session U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.39/11 at 173, 179 (1968).
See Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice:
Treaty Interpretationand Certain other Treaty Points, 28 BYI.L. at 1 (1951); Jacobs,
supra note 116, at 318-20; Pratap, supra note 116, at 53.
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We should add to these three categories, the contextual or
inclusive approach of Professor McDougal and his Yale associates. 1 79 Also, we should note Professor Schwarzenberger's view

that there is only one rule; that treaties should be interpreted in
a spirit of equity (jus aequum), that is in accordance with good
faith, common sense and reasonableness. 8
Going back to earlier history, scholars and arbitral tribunals
developed sets of rules or canons of interpretation. These begin
with Vattel's famous maxim that "[i]t is not permissible to interpret what has no need of interpretation."' 8 ' Like Professor

Antieau's Guides, 18 2 they go from the plain meaning rule

through familiar maxims of ejusdem generis, expressio unius,
etc., to various canons of restrictive and liberal construction.
Perhaps the most important of these are the principle of restrictive interpretation in favor of State sovereignty and the more
accepted and acceptable principle of effectiveness. 8 3 Here again,

one can find a maxim for almost every position. 84 While used in
argument and cited by courts, they are today, with few exceptions, generally dismissed or reduced to text book headings.L85
A more useful survey of recent history takes the form of a
review of draft articles proposed or adopted on the interpretation of treaties. 8 6

"'

M. McDOUGAL & J. MILLER, supra note 116.

supra note 116, at 82, 83, 91, 94, 215-16, 225, & 277.
199 (Fenwick trans. 1916); see Sharma, supra note
116, at 373; Falk, supra note 116, at 108; Lauterpacht, supra note 116, at 48.
"' See infra text accompanying notes 148-53. Compare the list in I OPPENHEIM, 85663, sec. 553-54 (8th ed. 1948). See also Georges Pinson Case, 5 R.I.A.A. 422, ANN. DIG.
PUB. INT'L L. CASES 1927-28, Case No. 292 (Verzijl, J.).
183 See Lauterpacht, supra note 116; Degan, supra note 116, at 20-34; Jacobs, supra
note 116, at 334; LORD McNAm, supra note 116, at 383-92.
18, See infra text accompanying note 153. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht after noting Vattel's maxim, quoted above at supra note 181, pointed out that
...it was followed by other general principles, by presumptions, and by elaborate
distinctions between things favourable and odious. It is doubtful whether any
party to a dispute involving the interpretation of a treaty can fail to derive some
advantage from the rich choice of weapons in Vattel's armoury of rules of
interpretation.
Lauterpacht, supra note 116, at 48.
18' See LORD McNAIR supra note 116, at 366. Compare C. ANTIEAU supra note 115,
at 11.
"88For some comparative studies of these drafts see Rosenne; Jacobs; Falk; Degan,
supra note 116.
180

SCHWARZENBERGER,

181

VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS
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The first of these texts is from the 1935 Draft Convention
on the Law of Treaties prepared by the Harvard Research in
International Law at a time when the League of Nations was
engaged in abortive codification efforts. Article 19 entitled "Interpretation of Treaties" read as follows:
(a) A treaty is to be interpreted in the light of the general
purpose which it is intended to serve. The historical background
of the treaty, travaux preparatoires,the circumstances of the
parties at the time the treaty was entered into, the change in
these circumstances sought to be effected, the subsequent conduct of the parties in applying the provisions of the treaty, and
the conditions prevailing at the time interpretation is being made,
are to be considered in connection with the general purpose which
the treaty is intended to serve.
(b) When the text of a treaty is embodied in versions in different languages, and when it is not stipulated that the version in
one of the languages shall prevail, the treaty is to be interpreted
with a view to giving to corresponding provisions in the different
versions a common meaning which will 7effect the general purpose
which the treaty is intended to serve.1

Since the emphasis here is on "the general purpose," this
may be considered a prime example of the teleological approach. 188 However, since "purpose" may also be taken to mean
the actual intent of the parties, and since travaux preparatoires
and circumstances at time of conclusion are given a prominent
place among the factors to be considered, it has also been described as an example of the subjective school." 9
The next text, adopted as a Resolution of the Institut de
Droit International in 1956, marks a decisive step in the development of the law relating to interpretation. 9 0 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, the first Rapporteur, had strongly urged an approach
Article 9, Interpretationof Treaties;Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties,
29 A.J.I.L. 937, 971 (supp. 1935).
188 Jacobs, supra note 116, at 323-24. Jacobs considers that this approach was influ187

enced by "legal realist" jurisprudence. Id. at 323 & n.16.
18' Degan, supra note 116, at 11-2. See also Pratap, supra note 116, at 60-61;
Sharma, supra note 116, at 382. Dr. Pratap considers that the Harvard Draft has contextual features, stresses the subjective method, emphasizes the rule of effectiveness, and
opens the door to teleological interpretation. Surya Sharma refers to contextual features.
10' Rosenne, supra note 116, at 229. See THE LAW OF TREATIES, A GUIDE TO THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION 40 (1970).
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based on the intention of the parties and stressed the importance of travaux preparatoires.This approach came under attack at sessions of the Institut, particularly by his fellow countryman Sir Eric Beckett. Sir Hersch was succeeded as
Rapporteur by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice whose draft emphasizing
a textual approach was approved by the Institut. The Resolution is as follows:
The Institute of International Law is of the opinion that
when it becomes necessary to interpret a treaty, States and international organizations and tribunals may be guided by the following principles:
Article 1
1. The agreement of the parties having been embodied in the
text of the treaty, it is necessary to take the natural and ordinary
meaning of the terms of this text as the basis of interpretation.

The terms of the provisions of the treaty should be interpreted in
their context as a whole, in accordance with good faith and in the
light of the principles of international law.
2. If, however, it is established that the terms used should be

understood in another sense, the natural and ordinary meaning of
these terms will be displaced.
Article 2
I. In the case of a dispute brought before an international
tribunal it will be for the tribunal, while bearing in mind the provisions of the first article, to consider whether and to what extent
there are grounds for making use of other means of
interpretation.
2. Amongst the legitimate means of interpretation are the
following:
(a) Recourse to preparatory work;
(b) The practice followed in the actual
application of the treaty;
(c) The consideration of the objects of the
treaty."'
The American approach, which is basically contextual, is
found in Sections 146 and 147 of the Second Restatement of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965). These Sec-

91

46 ANNUAIRE 358-59, 364-65, english trans. at 2 Y.B.

INT'L L. COMM'N 55

(1964).

See Fitzmaurice, supra note 175, at 210 n.3; Pratap, supra note 116, at 61-62; Jacobs,
supra note 116, at 322, 344; Degan, supra note 116, at 12-14.
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tions provide:
146. Basis of Interpretation
The extent to which an international agreement creates,
changes, or defines relationships under international law is determined in case of doubt by the interpretation of the agreement.
The primary object of interpretation is to ascertain the meaning
intended by the parties for the terms in which the agreement is
expressed, having regard to the context in which they occur and
the circumstances under which the agreement was made.
This meaning is determined in the light of all relevant
factors.
147. Criteria for Interpretation
(1) International law requires that the interpretative process
ascertain and give effect to the purpose of the international agreement which, as appears from terms used by the parties, it was
intended to serve. The factors to be taken into account by way of
guidance in the interpretative process include:
(a) the ordinary meaning of the words of the agreement in
the context in which they are used;
(b) the title given the agreement and statements of purpose
and scope included in its text;
(c) the circumstances attending the negotiation of agreement;
(d) drafts and other documents submitted for consideration,
action taken on them, and the official record of the deliberations
during the course of the negotiation;
(e) unilateral statements of understanding made by a signatory before the agreement came into effect, to the extent that
they were communicated to, or otherwise known to, the other signatory or signatories;
(f) the subsequent practice of the parties in the performance
of the agreement, or the subsequent practice of one party, if the
other party or parties knew or had reason to know of it;
(g) change of circumstances, to the extent indicated in § 153;
[Rule of Rebus Sic Stantibus]
(h) the compatibility of alternative interpretations of the
agreement with (i) the obligations of the parties to other states
under general international law and other international agreements of the parties, and (ii) the principles of law common to the
legal systems of the parties or of all states having reasonably developed legal systems;
(i) comparison of the texts in the different languages in which
the agreement was concluded, taking into account any provision
in the agreement as to the authoritativeness of the different texts.
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(2) The ordinary meaning of the words of an agreement, as
indicated in Subsection (1)(a), must always be considered as a
factor in the interpretation of the agreement. There is no established priority as between the factors indicated in Subsection
(l)(b)-(i) or as between them and additional factors not listed
therein. '
The final Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties of the International Law Commission were published at almost the same
time in 1966. While the ILC also adopted a contextual approach,
it was a narrower one favoring text over actual intent. This was
accomplished by placing preparatory work in a separate Article
on "Supplementary means of interpretation" and narrowly confining the circumstances in which the supplementary means
were to be used.
Mention must also be made of the publication in the following year 1967 of the monumental treatise The Interpretationof
Agreements and World Public Order by McDougal, Lasswell
and Miller,19 3 which set forth an even broader contextual approach than that of the Restatement.
At the first session of the Vienna Conference on the Law of
Treaties in 1968, Professor McDougal, representing the United
States, urged a broader contextual approach than that contained
in the Commission's text. To accomplish this, he presented a
U.S. amendment to combine the ILC Draft Articles, thus giving
preparatory work an equal status with other considerations. 9 4
After a lively discussion, the U.S. Amendment was rejected by
sixty-six votes to eight, with ten abstentions,' 195 and in the following session, in 1969, the ILC Articles on interpretation, with
only minor drafting changes, were adopted unanimously by the
Conference.' 9" These Articles in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties are as follows:
Article 31
Generalrule of interpretation
I's RESTATEMENT (SECOND), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 449-60
(Revisions May 20, 1964 & May 20, 1965) (1965).
193 M. McDOUGAL & J. MILLER, supra note 116.
"9 Official Records Vienna Conference, First Session 167-68 (1968). For text of the
U.S. draft amendment see U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/C.1iL.156.
" Id. at 185.
'"

Plenary Meetings, supra note 174, at 57-59.
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1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a
treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the
treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty;
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the
context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its
provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
Article 32
Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning
when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable.
Article 33
Interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more
languages
1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless
the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.
2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of
those in which the text was authenticated shall be considered an
authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the parties so
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agree.
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same
meaning in each authentic text.
4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with
paragraph 1, when a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a
difference of meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32
does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts,
having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be
adopted. 9 '
It may be recalled that in preparing the American Law Institute's Third Restatement, it was at first proposed to include
the full text of the Vienna Articles in three black letter rules. 198
However, the final text completed in 1986, contains only one section which reads as follows:
325. Interpretation of International Agreement
(1) An international agreement is to be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its
terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
(2) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding
the interpretation of the agreement, and subsequent practice between the parties in the application of the agreement, are to be
taken into account in its interpretation.'9"
This reproduces, in substance Article 31, paragraphs 1 and
3(a) and, with some modification, 3(b). It will be noted that with
respect to 3(b) on subsequent practice, the clause "which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation"
has been omitted from the Restatement. Other provisions of the
Vienna Articles on interpretation are covered in the Comment.
The substance of paragraph 2 of Article 31 defining "context" is
reproduced.2 0 0 With respect to Article 32 on "Supplementary
means," the Comment states:
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention reflects reluctance to
permit the use of materials constituting the development and negotiation of an agreement (travaux preparatoires)as a guide to
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatiese, arts. 31-33.

''

198 RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED),

tive Draft No. 1, Sec. 329, 330, 331, pp. 145-46, 148-49, 150-51 (1980).
I" RESTATEMENT (THIRD), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

Tenta-

STATES, 190,

196

(1987).
"

Id. at 197.
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the interpretation of the agreement. The Convention's inhospitality to travaux is not wholly consistent with the attitude of the
International Court of Justice and not at all with that of United
States courts. 0
As this Comment may suggest, there is still room for argument concerning the use of travaux preparatoires.There is no
doubt that the Convention establishes a definite hierarchy between the General Rule of Article 31 and the Supplementary
means, including the preparatory work, of Article 32. It was,
however, the opponents of the separation who, in arguing for a
change in the ILC format, took a very restrictive view of the
uses permitted by Article 32, while the supporters of the text as
it stood argued that it permitted flexibility. The ILC in its Commentary explained that,
. . the provisions of Article 28 [now 32] by no means have the
effect of drawing a rigid line between the 'supplementary' means
of interpretation and the means included in Article 27 [now 31].
The fact that Article 28 [now 32] admits recourse to supplementary means for the purpose of 'confirming' the meaning resulting
from the application of Article 27 [now 31] establishes a general
link between the two articles and maintains the unity of the process of interpretation. 202
*

The two Articles are not a description of the process of interpretation. Normally, the parties will have brought relevant
parts of the travaux supporting their respective positions to the
attention of the tribunal which will have such material before it
when it begins the process of interpretation. 23 The two Articles
indicate the relative weight to be given to the various factors,
not the processes followed by the interpreter.0 4
Id. See also comment g at 198 and reporters' notes at 198-99.
note 178, at 220, 354.
supra note 116, at 520; Gross, supra note 116, at 117; Fitzmaurice, supra note 178, at 13 n.1.
201

2'0 ILC Report, supra
203 Kearney & Dalton,
'"

I. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

116-17 (2d ed.

1984) writes:
As Professor Briggs points out [The travaux preparatoiresof the Vienna Convention on the Law Of Treaties, 65 A.J.I.L. 709 (1971)], no rigid temporal prohibition
on resort to travaux preparatoiresof a treaty was intended by the use of the
phrase 'supplementary means of interpretation' in what is now Article 32 of the
Vienna Convention... [T]he Convention rules on interpretation reflect an attempt to assess the relative value and weight of the elements to be taken into
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While there are many points that might be discussed in relation to treaty interpretation, I will deal with the same three
points considered with respect to constitutional construction:
the idea of evolutionary development, subsequent practice and
structural interpretation. In addition, I would add the principle
of effectiveness.
Obviously the idea of a living, evolving instrument does not
have the same hold in normal treaty interpretation that it does
in constitutional construction. However, it is not entirely absent
from the law of treaties. Lord McNair, under the heading "Relative Terms" points out that "[e]xpressions such as 'suitable, appropriate, convenient,' occurring in a treaty are not stereotyped
as at the date of the treaty but must be understood in the
light
20 5
of the progress of events and changes in habits of life.
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice concedes: "Yet it is difficult to deny
that the meaning of a treaty, or of some part of it (particularly
in the case of certain kinds of treaties and conventions), may
undergo a process of change or development in the course of
20
time.
The idea of evolutionary development is particularly applicable to treaties of a constitutional character. An outstanding
example is the statement of the International Court of Justice in
the Namibia case:
...the Court is bound to take into account the fact that the
concepts embodied in article 22 of the Covenant - 'the strenuous
conditions of the modern world' and 'the well-being and development' of the peoples concerned - were not static, but were by definition evolutionary, as also, therefore, was the concept of the 'sacred trust.' The parties to the Covenant must consequently be
deemed to have accepted them as such. That is why, viewing the
institutions of 1919, the Court must take into consideration the
changes which have occurred in the supervening half-century, and
its interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent development of the law, through the Charter of the United Nations

account in the process of interpretation rather than to describe the process of
interpretation itself.
Id. at 116-17 (original emphasis).
205 LORD McNAIR, supra note 116, at 467.
'"
Fitzmaurice, supra note 175, at 225. See also Judicial Innovation, supra note
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and by way of customary law. 0°7
It is the teleological approach, and especially its more extreme form of "emergent purpose,"' ' that best lends itself to
evolutionary development. The International Law Commission
was reluctant to open too wide the door to teleological interpretation, but, nevertheless, open it did. The text as approved by
the Commission and adopted in Vienna offers several possibilities for change.
First, there is the phrase "in the light of its object and purpose" in the first paragraph of Article 31. This is the ear mark of
the teleological approach.2 9
Second, the Commission's original draft placed the reference to international law in the first paragraph of what is now
Article 31 and read "in the light of the general rules of international law in force at the time of its conclusion."' 10 Some members of the Commission suggested that this wording "failed to
deal with the problem of the effect of an evolution of the law on
the interpretation of legal terms in a treaty."2 1 ' The Commission, considering that the formula was unsatisfactory since it
covered only partially the question of inter-temporal law, revised
the text to read "any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties" and transferred it to its
present position in paragraph 3.2 The phrase "in force at the
time of its conclusion" was dropped.
Mr. Myslil, representing Czechoslovakia at the Vienna Conference, in commenting on this change, said:

20I

Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 31, quoted in Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 32, paras. 56

& 54 (Advisory Opinion). See also E. MCWHINNEY,

CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE, INTERNA-

63 (1981). The Court in Aegean
Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Tur.) 1978 I.C.J. 3, also accepted the evolutionary
meaning of "territorial status" which it called a generic term. The Court said: ". . . the
presumption necessarily arises that its meaning was intended to follow the evolution of
the law and to correspond with the meaning attached to the expression by the law in
force at any given time." Id. at 32. See also Elias, The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law,
74 A.J.I.L. 285, 296-302 (1980).
208 Jacobs, supra note 116, at 320, 337; Pratap, supra note 116, at 57. Compare I.
SINCLAIR, supra note 204, at 138-40.
209 Jacobs, supra note 116, at 337-38; Gottlieb, supra note 116, at 123.
2 0 ILC Report, supra note 178, at 357 (original emphasis).
211 Id.
2 ILC Report, supra note 178, at 222, 358. See Jacobs, supra note 116, at 330-31.
TIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER IN REVOLUTIONARY AGE
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• . . it was in the interests of the international community to take
into account the rules of international law in force at the time of
application of the treaty. Principles and institutions of law underwent changes in the course of time . . . A static interpretation of
the law could lead to misinterpretation.2 3
The third provision that opens the door to development
brings us to our second point; subsequent practice. Paragraph
3(b) of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides: "There
shall be taken into account, together with the context . . . (b)
any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation."2 1 4
While paragraph 3 deals with factors extrinsic to the text,
the ILC Commentary points out that the three elements in this
paragraph (subsequent agreements, subsequent practice, and international law) "are all of an obligatory character and by their
very nature could not be considered to be norms of interpretation in any way inferior to those which precede them."2 1
The fact that there is no hierarchical order among the various elements in Article 31 is not only expressly confirmed in the
Commentary but can be derived from the text without resort to
travaux preparatoires.The title of Article 31 "General rule of
interpretation" is in the singular, indicating that the Article,
taken as a whole, is a single rule,2"" and the introductory words
of paragraph 3 - "There shall be taken into account together
with the context" - incorporates this paragraph into paragraph
1.217

The use of subsequent practice in the interpretation of treaties was well established in international law prior to the work of
the ILC. All of the drafts, from the Harvard Research through
the Resolution of the Institut de Droit International,to the
American Law Institute's Restatements, recognize subsequent
practice as a factor to be taken into account in interpretation.2 8
Vienna Conference Official Records, supra note 178, at 182.
2" Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatise, art. 31, para. 3, pt. b.
2
ILC Report, supra note 178, at 220, 353.
210 Id.
at 220, 352.
217 Id. at 220, 353 (original emphasis). See Jacobs, supra note 116, at 327, 329, 332;
Pratap, supra note 116, at 59-60, 68-69.
2," See infra text accompanying notes 186-201.
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Resort to practice is also sanctioned in opinions of the International Court and other tribunals.2 1 9 It is one of the six principles
(Major Principle V) distilled by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice from the
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice.2 20
Lord McNair, having dismissed most rules and canons of interpretation, opened his chapter on subsequent practice with the
declaration:
Here we are on solid ground and are dealing with a judicial
practice worthy to be called a rule . . . the relevant conduct of
the contracting parties after the conclusion of the treaty (sometimes called 'practical construction') has a high probative value
as
221
to the intention of the parties at the time of its conclusion.
The concluding words of the foregoing passage from Lord
McNair call attention to a view also expressed in some opinions
of the International Court that the value of subsequent practice
is evidence of the original intention of the parties.222 Viewed in
this light subsequent practice would be a subordinate principle
2 2 In fact, Sir
comparable to travaux preparatoires
Humphrey
Waldock, following the lead of the Institut in his original draft
proposals, did include subsequent practice with other materials
which were later to be labeled supplementary means of interpretation.224 The idea that subsequent practice is evidence of original intent is often a legal fiction which becomes more and more
so as one is removed from the time of conclusion, and particularly as additional States accede to a multilateral convention.2 2 5
"I See Competence of the General Assembly for Admission of a State to the United
Nations, 1950 1.C.J. 4, 9 (Advisory Opinion); SWA Voting Procedures case, 1955 I.C.J.
67 (Lauterpacht J., separate opinion). See Pratap supra note 116, at 59 n.14. For an
analysis of these and other cases see Engel, "Living" International Constitutions and
The World Court (The Subsequent Practiceof InternationalOrgans under their Constituent Instruments), 16 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 865 (1967).
220 Fitzmaurice, supra note 178, at 20-22; supra note 175 at 223-25.
221 LORD McNAIR, supra note 116, at 424. Lord McNair adds: " This is both good
sense and good law." Id. at 424.
..
2 Interpretation of Article 3, Para. 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne, 1925 P.C.I.J., Ser.
B, No. 12, 24 (Advisory Opinion); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co, 1952 I.C.J. 93, 107 (Judgment).
See Fitzmaurice, supra note 175, at 224; Jacobs, supra note 116, at 328-29.
.23Fitzmaurice, supra note 175, at 224.
224 Third Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties, Part III, Sec.
III, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 52 (1964), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/167/Add.3, art. 71 para. 2. See
Jacobs, supra note 116, at 327.
22 Sharma, supra note 116, at 370-71; M. McDoUGAL & J. MMLER, supra note 116,

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol1/iss1/3

48

1989]

U.N. CHARTER

This semi-fictional approach was rejected by the Commission,
and under the Convention it is present agreement, not original
intent, indicated by practice that is significant. 2 6
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, noting that the meaning of a treaty
may undergo a process of change or development.2 7 and taking a
very formal view, continued:
Where this occurs, it is the practice of the parties in relation
to the treaty that effects, and indeed is, that change or development. In that sense there is no doubt about the standing of the
principle, as an independent principle, which, in a proper case, it
may be not only legitimate but necessary to make use of; for what
is here in question is not so much the meaning of an existing text,
as a revision of it, but a revision brought about by practice or
conduct, rather than effected by and recorded in writing . . .
Looked at in this way, a legitimate place can be found for the
doctrine of 'emergent purpose'

. . .

not as a theory of interpreta-

tion, but as a substantive rule of treaty law affecting the revision
of treaties .... 228
It is, however, difficult and often impossible to draw a line
between interpretation and revision. So long as the meaning may
be derived from the treaty, even if that meaning has undergone
changes and development, it remains interpretation.2 29
at 98-99; Falk, supra note 116, at 132; Gordon, The World Court and the Interpretation
of Constitutive Treaties, Some Observations on the Development of an International
Constitutional Law, 59 A.J.I.L. 794, 827 (1965).
22 Sloan, General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years Later), 58 B.Y.I.L.
39, 61 (1987); Higgins, The Development of InternationalLaw by the Political Organs
of the United Nations, 59 PROC. AM. Soc. INrr'L L. 119 (1965); Schachter, The QuasiJudicial Role of the Security Council and the General Assembly, 58 A.J.I.L. 962 (1964);
Sir Ian Sinclair, statement on behalf of the U.K., Vienna Conference, supra note 178, at
177; Jacobs, supra note 116, at 329; Gordon supra note 225, at 826-28; E. Lauterpacht,
supra note 50, at 447, 453-54, 458-59; McGinley, Practiceas a Guide to Treaty Interpretation, 9 FLETCHER FORUM 211 at 220-22, 227-30 (1985). McGinley states: "The evidentiary value of practice . . . lies not as a manifestation of intent, but rather as an indicator of the soundness of the interpretation. This is because practice represents the
common-sense practical interpretation of the treaty under the varied contingencies of its
on going operation." Id at 227.
s See infra text accompanying note 206.
Fitzmaurice, supra note 175, at 225 (original emphasis). See also id. at 210, 22223.
229 See McGinley, supra note 226, at 222-26; L SINCLAIR, supra note 204, at 137-38.
The ILC had included an article on Modification of Treaties by subsequent practice
(Art. 38), see ILC Report, supra note 178, at 236, and 354, but this was deleted by the
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A final question is whose practice is relevant? As previously
noted it is the practice of present parties, not just that of the
original parties, that is to be taken into account. 30 In an earlier
draft, the ILC referred to the understanding of all the parties. In
omitting the word "all," the Commission explains that it did not
intend to change the rule. The omission did have a purpose but
this was "merely to avoid any possible misconception that every
party must individually have engaged in the practice where it
suffices that it should have accepted the practice. 2 31 Some writers have suggested that in the case of multilateral conventions a
"great majority," rather than all, of the parties is required.23 2
More significantly, the International Court of Justice has accepted the practice of International Organizations in the interpretation of their constituent instruments.3 3 Gerald P. McGinley has noted that:
Insofar as the court is concerned it has, in general, been prepared to consider the resolutions of international bodies as a major, if not primary source of interpretative practice by those organizations. It has given little weight to the existence of dissenting
minorities, abstentions, or qualified assents,
as invalidating the
23 4
interpretive value of the resolution itself.

It has also been pointed out that subsequent practice of
only some of the parties which does not qualify for authentic
interpretation under Article 31(3)(b) may still have evidentiary
value under the blanket reference to supplementary means in

Vienna Conference see Vienna Conference, supra note 178, at 215. This action, while
removing an open invitation to amend a treaty by subsequent practice, does not alter the
fact that interpretation shades into modification and amendment, nor does an omission
from the Convention alter general international law on the subject. See Jacobs, supra
note 116, at 331-32.
22
See infra text accompanying notes 222-26.
231 ILC Report, supra note 178, at 222, 357.
"'
Fitzmaurice, supra note 175, at 223; Pratap, supra note 116, at 60; see also Jacobs, supra note 116, at 327.
'33 Competence of the ILO in Regard to International Regulation of the Conditions
of Labour of Persons Employed in Agriculture, 1922 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No.2, at 39-41 (Advisory Opinion); Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 22; CertainExpenses, 1962 I.C.J. at 159-60, 168;
Competence for Admission, 1950 I.C.J. at 4. See McGinley, supra note 226, at 215; Engel, supra note 219; Rosenne, Is the Constitution of an International Organization on
International Treaty, Reflections on the Codification of the Law of Treaties, 12
COMUNIcAZIONI E STUDI 21 at 48, 74-80.
23 McGinley, supra note 226, at 215-16.
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Article 32.35
The third point concerns structural interpretation which
may be considered a variant of the teleological approach.
Neither the Vienna Convention, nor the ILC Commentary develops a theory of structural interpretation, but reference to "context" and "object and purpose" provide elements for such
approach.
The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities offers the outstanding example of structural interpretation of treaties. The Treaty of Rome and its companion
conventions are not viewed as ordinary international treaties
subject to the usual rules of treaty interpretation, but more like
a national constitution to be interpreted broadly and
23 6
dynamically.
Judge Kutcher, President of Chamber at the Court, lists literal, historical, comparative, and schematic and teleological
methods of interpretation used by the Court of Justice. He adds
that the literal and historical methods recede into the background while the schematic and teleological method is of primary importance. 3 7 Combining schematic and teleological into a
single method produces an approach very close to Professor
Charle Black's structural interpretation. Anna Bredimas describes the process as follows: " . . . the Court does not consider
the purposes to be achieved by the Communities but rather
starts from the fact that the Communities exist and by deduc-

'3' 1. SINCLAIR, supra note 204, at 138.

236 H. KUTCHER, Methods of Interpretation as seen by a Judge at the Court of Justice, Judicial and Academic Conference, 1-30-31, 1-39 (27-28 September 1976). Judge
Kutcher states:
The special nature of the Community, which must be regarded, not as an
association of States subject to international law, but as a community sui generis
is orientated to the future and designed with a view to the alteration of economic
and social relationships and progressive integration, rules out a static and requires
dynamic and evolutionary interpretation of Community law.
Id. at 1-39 (original emphasis). Judge Kutcher thinks, however, that "the rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention . . . may lead to standardization and also, to a certain degree, to a modification of the rules of interpretation hitherto applied in public
international law. Id. at 1-31. See also Bredimas, Methods of Interpretation and Community Law, 6 EUR. STUD. L. (1978); Stein, supra note 101, at 491- 518. But see P. V. van
Themaat, The Impact of the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities on the Economic World Order, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1422, at 1431 (1984).
...Kutcher, supra note 236, at 15-6.
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tion draws the consequences of the established order."2 '
The Court postulates a Community and reaches results necessary to safeguard and develop its capacity to function. Thus,
in the Van Gend and Loos case,239 the Court established the direct applicability of Community law in the national legal order
of its members; in the case of Costa v. ENEL,24 ° it established
the supremacy of Community law over national law; and in the
ERTA case,24 the competence of the Community to conclude
international transport agreements. 4 2
The final point is the principle of effectiveness. This is expressed in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat and,
probably next to "clear meaning," is referred to more frequently
than any other principle in opinions of international courts and
tribunals. 4 s
2.
219

240
2"

Bredimas, supra note 236, at 79.
9 Recueil 1, [1963] Common Mrt. Rep. (CCH) 8008 (1963), [1963] E.C.R. 1.
10 Recueil 1141, [1964] Common Mrt. Rep. (CCH) 8023, [1963] E.C.R. 1.
Commission v . Council (ERTA), Case 22/70, 17 Recueil 263; [1971] Common

Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8134 (1971).
242 See Bredimas, supra note 236, at 77-78; Kutcher, supra note 236, at 32-33; Stein,
supra note 101, at 496-505. The European Court of Human Rights has also used a structural approach in some cases. See Golder case, 21 Feb. 1975, 57 I.L.R. 201-61 (1980), and
criticism of the case in I. SINCLAIR, supra note 204, at 128, 131-33. In a somewhat different sense the International Court of Justice has referred to the structure of the Charter
and relations of organs. See Certain Expenses, 1962 I.C.J. at 157; Competence for Admission, 1950 I.C.J. at 9.
243 Degan, supra note 116, at 21. Effectiveness is also a principle applied in constitutional construction. A search of Lexis and Westlaw by Richard Duffee indicates that the
Supreme Court has quoted the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat a number of
times (usually in connection with wills, patents or contracts). It has rarely referred to the
maxim in a constitutional case; see Fort Leavenworth Railroad Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525
at 534 (1885); (Field, J., quoting Story, J.); United States v. Cornell, 25 Cas. 646, 649
(C.C.D.R.I. 1819)(No. 14,867) nor has it refered to the "principle of effectiveness"or
"rule of effectiveness" by name in constitutional cases. Labels aside, however, it has on
occasion used the principle. See quotation from United States v. Classic, supra note 153:
"... we cannot rightly prefer, of the possible meanings of its words, that which will
defeat rather than effectuate the constitutional purpose." Id. at 316; Case v. Bowles, 327
U.S. at 92 (1946): "To construe the Constitution as preventing this would be to read it as
a self-defeating charter. It has never been so interpreted." Id. at 102. See also discussion
of implied powers in McCulloch, see infra text accompanying notes 11, 32-43. Chief Justice Marshall clearly enunciated the principle in his defence of McCulloch v. Maryland,
see G. GUNTHER, supra note 51, at 166-67. See also Justice Brewer who, speaking for the
Court in Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 290 (1901), and in Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46, 88 (1907), enunciated the principle but apllied it restrictively. See further
references cited in C. ANTIEAU, supra note 115, at 23, 25-26, 36-38. See also Dodd, supra
note 34.
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The principle of effectiveness is not expressly formulated in
the Vienna Convention, but there was no intention to exclude it.
The Commission considered that insofar as the maxim reflects a
true general rule of interpretation, it is embodied in the first
paragraph of what is now Article 31, "which requires that a
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in the context of the
treaty and in the light of its object and purpose." 244 The Commission considered that "[wihen a treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does and the other does not enable the
treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and the objects and
purposes of the treaty demand that the former interpretation
should be adopted." ' 5
The Commission, however, did not wish to encourage an extensive application of the principle and quoted approvingly from
the opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Peace
Treaties case: 2"
The principle of interpretation expressed in the maxim: ut res
magis valeat quam pereat, often referred to as the rule of effectiveness, cannot justify the Court in attributing to the provisions
for settlement of disputes in the Peace Treaties a meaning which
...would be contrary to their letter and spirit. 47
The Commission also noted that the Court had emphasized
that to adopt an interpretation running counter to the clear
meaning would not be to interpret, but to revise the treaty. 24 8
This same provision was also quoted by the Court in the
disastrous 1966 South West Africa cases2 49 in an opinion one is
tempted to compare with that of Chief Justice Taney in Scott v.
Sanford.250 The 1966 Court was itself equally divided,2 5 ' and the
ILC Report, supra note 178, at 299, 351 (original emphasis).
Id.
246 1950 I.C.J. 221.
241 ILC Report, supra note 178, at 352, quoting Peace Treaties, Second Phase, 1950
I.C.J. at 229.
248 International Status of South West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. at 229; ILC Report,
244

245

supra note 178, at 219, 352. But see Peace Treaties, Second Phase, 1950 I.C.J. at 235-40
(Read, J., dissenting).
240 South West Africa, Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. 6, 48 (Judgement).
220 See infra text accompanying note 155. See also E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 207,
at 59-60.
221 The judges were divided seven to seven. The case was decided by the casting
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1950, 1955, 1956, 1962 and 1971 Courts held a quite different view
from that expressed by the evenly divided 1966 Court.25 2 While it
is arguable that a narrow application with respect to ordinary
treaties may in some circumstances be preferred, the principle of
effectiveness combined with the doctrine of implied powers is a
necessary tool in the interpretation of treatise which are constituent instruments of international organizations. 5 3
C.

Application to the United Nations Charter

Respecting the interpretation of the Charter, views have
been expressed, on the one hand, that resort should be made to
principles derived from national constitutional practice rather
than from treaty law, and, on the other hand, that all principles
of treaty law are to be strictly applied to the Charter.25 4 For reasons which by now should be obvious, this is an artificial issue.
The United Nations Charter, as noted at the outset of this pavote of the President. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 55(2).
252 See InternationalStatus of South West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. at 128; Africa Voting
case, 1955 I.C.J. at 67; SWA Hearings of Petitioners, 1956 I.C.J. at 23; Certain Expenses, 1962 I.C.J. at 319; Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 16; South West Africa Cases, 1966
I.C.J. at 6. See also Degan, supra note 116, at 22-32.
252 See H. Lauterpacht, supra note 116, at 68, 72.
254 For a review of literature on the subject see Sato, Constituent Instruments of
InternationalOrganizations and their Interpretative Framework - Introduction to the
PrincipalDoctrines and Bibliography, 14 HITOTSUBASHI J. L. & POL. 1, 1-22 (1986). For a
review of Eastern European positions see Macdonald, The United Nations Charter:
Constitution or Contract? in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: EsSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 889-912 (1983). See also Ciobanu, Impact of the Characteristics of the Charter upon Its Interpretation, in CURRENT
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS ON U.N. LAW AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
3-79 (Cassese 1975); B. COHEN, supra note 11, at 1-30; I. DE'TER, LAW MAKING BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 23-34 (1965); Engel, "Living" InternationalConstitutions and
the World Court, (The Subsequent Practice of InternationalOrgans under their Constituent Instruments), 16 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 865 (1967); Gordon, supra note 225, at 794833; Hambro (Pollux). supra note 116; Hexner, Teleological Interpretationof Basic Instruments of Public InternationalOrganizations in LAW, STATE AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HANS KELSEN 119-38 (Engel 1964); JIMANEZ DE ARfICHAGA, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS (COMENTARIO TEORICO PRACTICO DE LA
CARTA) 621-29 (1958); E. Lauterpacht, supra note 50, at 414-78; E. MCWHINNEY, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE
(The UN Charter: Treaty or Constitution) 53-70 (1981); Rosenne, Is the Constitution of
an InternationalOrganizationan InternationalTreaty?, Reflections on the codification
of the law of Treaties, 12 Comunicazioni e studi 21-89 (1966); Sohn, The New International Law: Protectionof the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 A.J.I.L. 1, 1314 (1982).
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per, is both a multilateral treaty and a constitution of an international organization. Moreover, there is considerable concordance between constitutional and treaty interpretation and a
good deal of flexibility within each system.
More progress, however, has been made in reaching a consensus on the formulation of principles of treaty interpretation
which are now incorporated in Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna
Convention. The treaty field, at least momentarily and on the
surface, seems less chaotic than the constitutional arena. In any
event, since the Charter is a treaty, the natural place to start is
with the principles of treaty interpretation; but always remembering that it is also a constitution we are interpreting."'
Article 5 of the Vienna Convention specifically states that it
is applicable to constituent instruments of international organizations. The text of this Article reads as follows: "The present
Convention applies to any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international organization and to any treaty adopted
within an international organization without prejudice to any
25
relevant rules of the organization.
However, Article 4 provides that the Convention applies
only to treaties concluded after its entry into force."6 7 It is not
immediately clear from the text whether Article 5 is an exception to this non-retroactivity principle or whether, as I would
assume from the general context, Article 4 controls. In any
event, problems might arise if the Vienna Convention were
deemed applicable between members of the U.N. who are parties to the Convention and not between members who are not
parties.26 8
25 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325
comment d, 197 (1987) ("Agreements creating international organizations have a constitutional quality,and are subject to the observation in McCulloch v. Maryland . .. that
'we must never forget, that it is a constitution that we are expounding.' ").
...Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 5.
...Art. 4 of the Vienna Convention reads:
Non-retroactivity of the present Convention
Without prejudice to the application of any rules set forth in the present Convention to which treaties would be subject under international law independently
of the Convention, the Convention applies only to treaties which are concluded by
States after the entry into force of the present Convention with regard to such
States.
Id. art. 4.
'66See Vierdag, supra note 116. There is also a question whether Art. 4 is a general
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Fortunately, these questions are of only academic interest
for our present purpose since the provisions of the Vienna Convention relating to interpretation are, if not a codification, at
least a crystallization of custom and, hence, binding as general
international law. We will, therefore, look to the Vienna Convention for guidance in the interpretation of the Charter. Before
leaving Article 5, however, we must note that the applicability of
the Convention is "without prejudice to any relevant rules of the
organization." These "rules" include not only formal written
rules adopted by the organization but also unwritten rules developed in practice.2 59 Thus, even by its terms the Convention
opens the door to special treatment for constituent instruments.
Some scholars, particularly those from Eastern European
countries, refer to the Charter not as a constitution but as a special treaty sui generis.26 0 Whether it is called a constitution, a
constituent instrument or a special treaty, the Charter has certain basic features which set it apart not only from bilateral
treaties, but from other multilateral treaties as well. In the first
place, it is a constituent instrument defining the structure of the
Organization and setting forth the powers and functions of its
organs and the rights and duties of its members. Second, it was
intended to endure not just for the present, or for the foreseeable future, but for "succeeding generations."2 6' 1 Third, it is su-

participation clause. Sir Ian Sinclair, correctly in my view, concludes that it is not. I.
supra note 204, at 8.
" See Vienna Conference Official Records, supra note 178, at 146, 147. See I. SINCLAIR, supra note 204, at 95. The ILC did not consider it necessary for the purpose of
formulating rules of interpretaion to distinguish between law making and other treaties traite-loi and traite-contrat,ILC Report, supra note 178, at 219, 351. Nor did it offer
special rules for multi-lateral and other classes of treaties, as suggested by McNair, The
Functions and Differing Legal Character of Treaties, 11 B.Y.I.L. 100 (1930). Lord McNair, considered that "constitutional treaties . . . create a kind of public law transcending in kind and not merely in degree the ordinary agreements between states." Id.
at 112. This provision in Art. 5 of the Vienna Convention - "without prejudice to any
relevant rules of the organization" - is the only general concession made to special types
of treaties. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 5.
260 See Macdonald, supra note 254, at 891, 896-97 citing Tunkin & Haraszti. See
also Ciobanu, supra note 254, at 3, 22-26.
' See the Preamble to the U.N. Charter: "to save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war .. " U.N. CHARTER pream. Sir Percy Spender in his separate opinion in
the Certain Expenses case, said the Charter's "provisions were of necessity expressed in
broad and general terms. It attempts to provide against the unknown, the unforeseen
and, indeed, the unforeseeable." Certain Expenses, 1962 I.C.J. at 185 (Spender, J.,

SINCLAIR,
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perior to all other treaties as a "higher law. '26 2 And fourth, the
States that participated in its drafting are today far out numbered by new members. There were only fifty States 263 represented at the San Francisco Conference, while the present membership of one hundred and fifty-nine is over three times that
number.
These special features preeminently warrant the application
of the points previously discussed relating both to treaty interpretation and to constitutional construction: evolutionary development, subsequent practice, structural interpretation and
effectiveness.
With regard to the point of evolutionary development, we
can say with Alexander Bicke1264 that the drafters were well
aware it was a constitution they were writing. Lord Halifax,
speaking at the San Francisco Conference on the Purposes and
Principles of the Charter, said:
I think they introduce a new idea into international relations,
seperate opinion).
22 Art. 103 of the Charter: "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under
any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail." U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
Moreover, Art. 2(6) provides: "The Organization shall ensure that states which are
not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may
be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security." Id. art. 2, para. 6.
Professor Sohn, supra note 254, writes:
This constitution of the world, the highest instrument in the intertwined hierarchy of international and domestic documents, prevails expressly over all other
treaties, and implicitly over all laws, anywhere in the world. The Charter was not
meant to be a temporary document, to be easily and perpetually amended, but,
rather, to be a lasting expression of the needs of humanity as a whole. Its basic
provisions, constituting the jus cogens, the practically immutable law of the international community, are broad in scope and sufficiently flexible to permit their
interpretation to be adjusted to the needs of each generation.
Id. at 13-14. See Macdonald, The Charterof the United Nations and the Development
of FundamentalPrinciples of InternationalLaw, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER ON HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTH-

196-215 (Cheng & Brown 1988); Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30
B.Y.I.L. 401, at 436-42 (1953); and in relation to Art. 20 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations see, H. Lauterpacht, The Covenant as the "HigherLaw," 17 B.Y.I.L. 54, 54-65
(1936).
"" There were fifty-one original members, but Poland was not represented at the
San Francisco Conference.
264 Bickel, supra note 115, at 63.
DAY
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for instead of trying to govern the actions of the Members and
the organs of the United Nations by precise and intricate codes of
procedure, we have preferred to lay down purposes and principles
under which they are to act. And by that means, we hope to insure that they act in conformity with the express desires of the
nations assembled here, while at the same time, we give them
freedom to accommodate their actions to circumstance which to26
day no man can foresee. 5
John Foster Dulles, representing the United States at San
Francisco, stated with respect to the domestic jurisdiction clause
(Article 2 (7)):
What is needed is a principle that is sufficiently basic to
guide the organization through the many years to come, and to
permit of evolution according to what may, during those years, be
the developing ideas and changing conditions of the world community . . . We in the United States have repeatedly given
thanks that the framers of our Constitution did not attempt to be
legalistic and to set up rigid lines of demarcation. We here will
equally serve the cause of posterity if we adopt for the world organization a principle of simple language which is clear in intent
26
and flexible in its application.
Ambassador Edvard Hambro, the first Registrar of the International Court of Justice and later President of the 25th Session of the General Assembly, writing in the 1946 British Year
Book of InternationalLaw, declared: "The Charter like every
written Constitution, will be a living instrument." ' 7
And Professor Oscar Schachter, in a book review of Kelsen's
The Law of the United Nations, writing as early as 1951 stated:

2"6 Verbatim Minutes of the First Meeting of Commission I, Doc. 10006, 1/6, 6
U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 26 (1945), quoted in Robinson, Metamorphosis of the United Nations,
94 RECUEIL DES couas 522 (1958-II).
26 Statement before Comm. I/1, verbatim in N.Y. Times, June 16, 1945, at 9, col. 3.
quoted by Schachter, supra note 99, at 652 n.47. See Claude, supra note 83, at 166.
267 Pollux (Hambro), supra note 116, at 54. Ambassador Hambro continued:
It will be applied daily; and every application of the Charter, every use of an Article, implies an interpretation; on each occasion a decision is involved which may
change the existing law and start a new constitutional development. A constitutional customary law will grow up and the Charter itself will merely form the
framework of the Organization which will be filled in by the practice of the different organs.
Id. at 54.
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The Charter is surely not to be construed like a lease of land
or an insurance policy; it is a constitutional instrument whose
broad phrases were designed to meet changing circumstances for
an undefined future. Any doubt as to the flexibility and adaptability of the Charter must surely have been resolved by recent
developments.""8
Both the U.S. Constitution and the U.N. Charter have
proved themselves sufficiently flexible to adapt to new situations. Neither document today is exactly the instrument envisaged by its drafters. Each is a living text capable of dealing with
the unforeseen and the unforeseeable.
As noted earlier, one of the doors opened in the Vienna
Convention to a teleological approach to interpretation is found
in the phrase in Article 31, paragraph 1, "in the light of its object
and purpose." It has been questioned whether the object and
purpose must be derived from the text of the treaty or whether
extrinsic evidence may be used. In the case of the Charter, it is
unnecessary to go outside the four corners of the instrument,
since the broad and sweeping language of the Preamble and of
Article 1 on the Purposes of the United Nations provide all the
elements that are necessary for a full implementation of this
approach." 9
With respect to effectiveness, we have already noted that
the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat coupled with the
doctrine of implied powers is particularly applicable in the interpretation of constituent instruments, and especially the Charter
of the United Nations. It is often stated that the principle of
effectiveness may not be used to revise a treaty, but where inter-

268

Book Review, 60 YALE L.J. 189, at 193 (1951)(reviewing H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF

THE UNITED NATIONS (1966). President George Bush, when he was Ambassador to the
United Nations, said in the General Assembly : "We have demonstrated in many other
actions here that the Charter is a flexible document. It was written by wise men to cope
with the unforeseeable." U.N. Doc. A/PV. 1976 & corr. (1971). See Bedjaoui, A Third
World view of International Organizations: Action towards a New InternationalEconomic Order, in THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 238 (Abi-Saab 1981);
Fitzmaurice, supra note 116, at 207-08; E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 207, at 55-56, quotations from Sohn, supra note 262, and Leieb, supra note 161, at 118-19; see also Robinson, supra note 265, at 558-59.
"Is See Haldernman, Legal Basis for United Nations Forces, 56 A.J.I.L. 971 (1962).
Haldernman looked to the phrase "collective measures" in art. 1, para. 1 (Purposes) of
the Charter as a basis for the establishment of U.N. peace keeping forces.
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pretation stops and revision begins is a shifting line that imposes
few permanent barriers to the necessary growth and development of the Organization.
So far as structural interpretation is concerned, it has not
been employed in the teleological sense used by the European
Court of Justice, although the International Court, in interpreting the Charter, has referred to "the structure of the Charter"
and "the relations established by it between the General Assembly and the Security Council." ' ° For the moment, structural interpretation remains in the background waiting to play its role
in the proper time and circumstances, as common needs, interests and values build from our international community of
States a world community of peoples.
Finally, there is Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention
dealing with subsequent practice. Interpretation through practice is a procedure allowing flexibility and organic growth. It is
particularly appropriate for documents like the Charter, whether
we call it a constitution, a constituent instrument or a special
treaty sui generis. Take, for example, Article 22 of the U.N.
Charter authorizing the General Assembly to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its
functions. This could have been interpreted narrowly to refer
only to committees and commissions set up to assist the Assembly through studies and advice. Instead it has been broadly interpreted to permit the establishment of a great variety of operational agencies including peace keeping forces, aid missions, an
environmental agency and other organs needed to meet particular exigencies. Compare this with the regulatory agencies established by the United States government which find no express
authorization in the Constitution. 1
As we have seen, interpretation through practice shades imperceptibly into informal amendment. An often cited example
concerns the voluntary abstention of the permanent members of
the Security Council. Article 27, paragraph 3, requires the affirmative vote of nine members including "the concurring votes

2170

Competence for Admission, 1950 I.C.J. at 8-9; Certain Expenses, 1962 I.C.J. at

2-71

Epstein, Self-Interest and the Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 153, 156 (1987);

157.
CARTER, supra note 55, at 860-61.
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of the permanent members" for decisions on all matters other
than procedure.2 7 2 Practice quickly established that abstentions
would not be considered vetoes. While not to be considered affirmative votes, they are in effect counted as "concurring votes"
allowing a resolution to be adopted. This firmly established
practice is variously considered either a broad interpretation or
an informal amendment by subsequent practice. 7 3
Peace keeping operations, developed by the General Assembly and subsequently followed by the Security Council are another example of interpretation or informal amendment through
practice. Peace keeping falls somewhere between peaceful settlement in Chapter VI and Enforcement Action in Chapter VII,
but finds no precise authorization in the Charter.
Another important example relates to resolutions of the
General Assembly of the United Nations. There is a popular
misconception that the Assembly can only make recommendations. Sir Francis Vallat, a former member of the International
Law Commission, has pointed out that more than twenty-five of
the one hundred and eleven Articles of the Charter "at least to
some extent, confer powers of decision as distinct from recommendation, on the General Assembly. 2 74 These are, of course,
for the most part, decisions relating either to the budget or to
the internal operations of the Organization.
There is, however, another type of resolution developed
through practice. This is the declaratory resolution. Let me
quote from my recent article in the 1987 British Year Book of
InternationalLaw:
Nothing in the Charter authorized [the adoption of such resolutions], but from its very first session the General Assembly ex272 U.N. CHARTER art.

27, para. 3.

...Stavropoulos, The Practiceof Voluntary Abstentions by Permanent Members of
the Security Council under Article 27, Paragraph3, of the Charter of the United Nations, 61 A.J.I.L. 737 (1967); Yuen-li Liang, The Settlement of Disputes in the Security
Council: The Yalta Voting Formula, 24 B.Y.I.L. 358 (1947); McDougal & Gardner, The
Veto and the Charter:an Interpretation for Survival, 60 YALE L. J. 258, 278-82 (1951);
JIMIkNEZ DE ARPCHAGA, VOTING AND THE HANDLING OF DISPUTES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

17-25 (1950); Sloan, supra note 226, at 98-9. For acceptance of the practice by the International Court of Justice see Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 22. See Hexner, supra note 254, at
126-28.
...Vallat, The Competence of the United Nations General Assembly, 97 RECUEIL
DES COURS

225, 229 (1959-II).
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ercised a right to adopt declarations and has continued to exercise this right without objection. This declaratory function of the
Assembly, if not inherent, has been established through intepretative practice or amendment and is long beyond any reasonable challenge. As a power not dependent on the text of Chapter IV of the Charter, it is not subject to limitations which may be
inferred from the word 'recommend' contained therein. This practice has certainly gone more than half-way toward establishing a
new source of law. There may even be indications in the treatment of certain Assembly resolutions that for this particular class
of resolutions practice has approached even closer to that goal.27
Professor Oscar Schachter has pointed out in this regard:
In the last few years, we have witnessed an increasing insistence on the authoritative character of General Assembly resolutions on intervention, self-determination, territorial occupation,
human rights, sharing of resources and foreign investment. They
purport to 'declare the law,' either in general terms or as applied
to a particular case. Neither in form nor intent are they recommendatory. Surprizing as it may seem, the authority of the General Assembly to adopt such declaratory resolutions was accepted
276
from the very beginning.
Such resolutions are assertions as to the law either as interpretations of the Charter or declarations of general international
law. They cannot be dismissed as "recommendations," which
they are not and are not to be evaluated as such. The question
of their legal effect or binding force must be examined and decided on other grounds. Some of the more important declarations - The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, and Resolution 1514(XV): Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
272 Sloan, supra note 226, at 99-100, 43-45 & n.16. For example see Resolutions

1514(XV) and 1803(XVII). With respect to 1514(XV) on principles of self-determination
see Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 31-33, and with respect to 1803(XVII) on permanent
sovereignty over natural resources see Professor Rene-Jean Dupuy's award in Texaco
Overseas Petroleum v. Libyan Arab Republic, 19 January 1977, 17 I.L.M. 24, 27-30
(1978).
.76Schachter, The Crisis of Legitimation in the United Nations, 50 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INTERNATIONAL RET: ACTA SCANDINAVICA JURIS GENTIUM 3, 3-4 (Alf Ross Memorial Lecture 1981).
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and Peoples - may be considered today as authentic interpretations of the Charter and, therefore, as a part of the constitutional structure if not of the instrument itself.
One may note a number of examples in the constitutional
history of the United States of latent powers which have been
recognized only after the passage of many years. I need mention
only the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Commerce Clause was certainly not read the
same by the court that decided Schechter2 7 in 1935 and the
court that decided Wickard278 in 1942. And it was a different
Fourteenth Amendment applied by the Court in Brown v. Board
of Education27 9 from that which guided the determination in
Plessy v. Ferguson.5 0
It is impossible to predict what latent powers may lie unexplored in the Charter of the United Nations, but there are many
possibilities for a time when circumstances are more propitious
and the exigencies of an evolving international and world community are more demanding. To take two of the more obvious
possibilities, let us look first at potential powers of the General
Assembly in economic, social and human rights matters, and
second, at the meaning of "action" in Article 2, paragraph 5, of
the Charter.
In the early days of the Charter there was considerable controversy whether the pledge in Article 56, that all members take
joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization
for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55, created legal obligations for the States. These Articles read:
Article 55
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and
well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall
promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions
of economic and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and reSchecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
279 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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lated problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion.2 '
Article 56
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of
the purposes set forth in Article 55.282
While it now seems clearly established that there are legal
obligations in Article 56,283 even the strongest supporters of this
position assumed that there were no corresponding powers beyond recommendation vested in the General Assembly. But is
this necessarily the case?
Considering Article 13, the first paragraph authorizes the
Assembly to initiate studies and make recommendations. The
second paragraph states that further responsibilities, functions
and powers, I emphasize powers, of the General Assembly with
respect to economic, social and human rights matters are set
forth in Chapters IX and X. So we go now to Chapter IX and
specifically to Articles 55, 56 and 60.284 It is, therefore, the Assembly with which all member States have pledged to cooperate.
In the proper time and circumstances it would not take a John
Marshall or even a Warren Court to find more than the power of
recommendation in this text.
The foregoing articles relate to the economic, social and
human rights fields. In contrast, the first part of Article 2, paragraph 5, concerns all United Nations activities. Paragraph 5,
provides: "All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present
Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state
281 U.N. CHARTER
282
28

art. 55.

Id. at art. 56.
Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 57. See Opinion of the United Nations Legal Department

of 12 May 1949, U.N. Doc. E/CN.5/126, 3 (presented to the Social Commission). See also
Schwelb, The InternationalCourt of Justice and Human Rights Clauses of the Charter,
66 A.J.I.L. 337 (1972); Sloan, supra note 226, at 49-50 & n.34.
284 Art. 60 provides: "Responsibility for the discharge of the functions of the Organization set forth in this Chapter shall be vested in the General Assembly and, under the
authority of the General Assembly, in the Economic and Social Council, which shall have
for this purpose the powers set forth in Chapter X." U.N. CHARTER art. 60.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol1/iss1/3

64

19891

U.N. CHARTER

against which the 285
United Nations is taking preventive or enaction.
forcement
The Report to the President on the San Francisco Conference said that the first part of this paragraph requires members
"to give to the Organization any assistance which their obligations under the Charter require of them.2' 8 Goodrich and Hambro add: "It imposes no obligations not provided for in other
parts of the Charter. 2 8 But that is not what the text says. It is
quite unequivocal in requiring the members to give "every assistance in any action" the United Nations takes in accordance
with the Charter. 8 8 Unlike the reference to "preventive and enforcement action" in the second part of the paragraph, action in
the first part is not limited to a particular kind of action. The
qualifying word "any" only emphasizes the generic use of the
term. The broad nature of the obligation was recognized by the
United States in its reliance on this Article as the basis for the
obligation of member States to support the action of the General
Assembly in terminating the Mandate of South Africa over
South West Africa (now Namibia).2 89 The potential in this Arti282 Id. at art. 2, para. 5.
286 Charter of the United Nations, Report to the President on the Results of the

San Francisco Conference, State Dept., Pub. 2349, Conference Series 71, at 41 (1945).
287 CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, COMMENTARY AND DOcuMENTs 107 (Revised 2d

ed. 1949). But see

GOODRICH, HAMBRO & SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 56-8
(3d ed. 1969).
The International Court of Justice in the Reparation case, said:
. . . the Court must stress the importance of the duty to render to the Organization 'every assistance' which is accepted by the Members in Article 2, paragraph 5, of the Charter. It must be noted that the effective working of the Organization - the accomplishment of its task, and the independence and effectiveness of
the work of its agents - require that these undertakings should be strictly
observed.
Reparation case, 1949 I.C.J. at 183. See also Sloan, supra note 226, at 51.
"" Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1970
I.C.J. Pleadings 883 (Written Statement of the U.S.). See letter of George H. Aldrich,

Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State, DIGEST

OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN

89 (McDowell 1975):
We have accepted this conclusion because we agree that it is a correct and
authoritative statement of the existing obligations of U.N. members under international law as a result of the termination by the General Assembly of the South
West Africa mandate and the assumption by the U.N. of responsibility and authority over Namibia. We did not consider that binding resolutions were necessary
to produce these obligations, for we believed that they flowed directly from the
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cle seems easily apparent in its express words without need to
refer to open texture or non-interpretive approaches to constitutional development.
VI.

Closing Remarks

It is not my purpose to suggest "correct" interpretations of
Articles of the Charter. This can better await future developments. Nor at this time am I suggesting the "proper" method of
Charter interpretation although I have indicated directions I
think appropriate. Approaches to interpretation present a continuum running from original intent to non-interpretivism in
constitutional construction and from strict textualism to emergent purpose in treaty law. Courts and other government departments and organs of international institutions have a wide range
of choice giving the necessary flexibility to meet the needs of our
evolving world community. From time to time they will undoubtedly choose from different points on the continuum.
My present purpose is only to note latent potentialities. The
weaknesses of the Organization are to be found, not so much in
the Charter as a Constitution, but in the will of the member
States to use it.

Charter, particularly Article 2, paragraph 5 which requires all members to assist
the United Nations in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter.
Id. at 89.
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